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Judicial ^ontrol of Legislation, 1S18-1848.
^he first constitution of Illinois contained little that was
original. Many of its provisions were copied from the earlier
constitutions of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and Indi-
ana. The latter, especially, was adopted but two years previous
to the Illinois constitution, and as it was the fundamental law
of a neighboring state, furnished the model for much of the Ill-
inois constitution. The device of a council of revision was,
however, borrowed from New York. In the states -/hose constitu-
tional institutions Illinois mainly copied the constitutions
did not recognize the doctrine of judicial control of legisla-
tion and the practice was not accepted without resistance in
all of them even at the time of the adoption of the Illinois
const itution . * In Kentucky, at least, opposition to the exer-
cise of the right o^ the courts to declare laws unconstitu-
tional was in existence even after the adoption of the Illi-
p
nois constitution. This may account in part for the absence
of recognition of the doctrine of judicial control in the Ill-
inois constitution, though it is more likely that no occasion
had arisen to bring the matter into prominence in Illinois,
and therefore it " ras not o f sufficient importance to warrant
introduction into the constitution.
Article I of the Illinois constitution of 1818 states in
substance the familiar doctrine of the separation of powers,
affirming the distinct character of legislative, executive and
judicial powers respectively, and denying to any " person or
coll ect
i
on o f person s be i ng one o_f _th ese department s " the
_
1. James, hT^T, The Introductory Articles of the Constitution
of Illinois. 2. "Rondy, Separation of Governmental Powers, Col-

right to exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others except as otherwise provided in the constitution.^
The interpretation of this article rendered by the Illinois
supreme court in the case of Field v. People in 1839, limited
in effect the sharp distinction usually made between the diff-
erent departments, and affirmed that, "in every state there is
a blending and admixture of different powers, so far as to
give each department a constitutional control over the others,
considered by the wisest statesmen as essential in a free gov-
2
eminent as is separation.' The court further stated in this
oninion that the true meaning of the article was that the
whole power of two or more departments might not be lodged in
the same hands. Such a doctrine was a natural expression from
a court, the judges of which were accustomed to participation
in legislation as members of a council of revision, "his view
if consistently maintained would, perhaps, have destroyed the
independence of the judiciary which is essential to the power
of passing upon the validity of laws. However, soon after the
decision in Field v. People the court declared certain acts of
the legislature unconstitutional and void as attempted exer-
cises of judicial power by the legislative department, thus
retaining the full vigor of the article as a means of protect-
i - the independence of the judicial department, to determine
the constitutionality of laws.
That it was not the purpose of the franers of the constitu-
tion to permit the courts to pass upon the validity of laws
after their passage might be inferred from the creation of a
council of revision by wh ich a partial control ove r legisla-
umbia Univ. Studies, vol . IV, pc.l rr". 188. 1. Constitution o r
111., 1818, Art. I, ^ecs. 1,2. 2. 3 111.779 (1839) 3. Lane v.

3tion was conferred upon the supreme court judges.^ By the con-
stitution, the governor and judges of the supreme court were
constituted a "council to revise all bills about to be passed
into laws by the general assembly". They were required to meet
when the general assembly was in session, receive and revise if
necessary all laws passed by both houses of the assembly and
return the same with their objections, if any. Upon return, the
assembly was required to reconsider the bills examined and re-
vised, ^he amended bill, however, might be rejected and the
original bill become a law if it received the votes of a maj-
ority of the number of representatives elected to the assembly.
It will be apparent at once, that the control thus exercised,
while not great, yet would have an undoubted tendency to shape
legislation in form and substance as desired by the judges.
In the judiciary article no reference is made to the right
to pa.ss upon the validity of laws. y Article IV* the judicial
power of the state was vested in a supreme court, consisting
of a chief justice and three associate justices any two of whom
constituted a quorum, and in such inferior courts as the gener-
al assembly might choose to establish, "he supreme court was
given appellate jurisdiction only, save in revenue, mandamus
and impeachment cases.
These provisions constitute the only authority in the con-
stitution of 1818 under which the judicial power of passing
upon the constitutionality of la-~ might be established. It is
clear that there was no iritentio.na.1 authorization of such prac-
tice, the more so, that another method for the control of leg-
islation ^wae^ ^definitely; ^ad opt ed
v
When, therefore^ we
_
shall find
Dorman, 4 111 . 287 . 1 . 111. Constitution, 1818, Art. Ill, sec. 19
2. Ill Constitution, 1818, Art. IV, sees. 1,2,3.

4.
that the supreme court has "begun to assume the power to declare
laws valid or invalid upon constitutional grounds, we shall be
compelled to look elsewhere for its origin.
Herman G. James in a monograph on the Introductory Arti-
cles of the Constitution of Illinois states! that the power of
the courts in Illinois to declare law3 void as constitutional,
was never questioned. Such, indeed, appears to be the case. It
must not be thought, however, that the doctrine was at once
applied. On the contrary, it was not until the June term of
court in 1826 that the issue of the constitutionality of a law
first arose and then only because conflicting acts of the legis-
lature were plead and it devolved upon the court as a necessity
to choose between them. 2 Not until the December term of
court in 1838 did the court discuss the doctrine of judicial
control and not until 1841 was any law held void as a violation
of the state constitution. That the doctrine of judicial power
to declare laws void was known to the court as early as 1826
appears from the opinion of Justice Lockwood in People ex rel
Ewing v. Forquer,^ in which, speaking for the court, he said:
"In the great case of Marbury and Madison, secretary of 3tate
for the United States, in the Supreme Court of the United States
(a tribunal filled with as enlightened and as able jurists as
ever graced the judgment seat in this or any other nation) the
questions which, in some respects, are similar to those in this
case, were pending before that court for two years. Yet the
opinion in that case, although conspicuous for its luminous
displays of deep research and constitutional learning, has not
given universal satisfaction."
_
i. p. 88. 3. Coles v. Madison County, 1 111. 154. 3. 1 111 134.

5.
Several causes may "be assigned for the slow appearance
and development of a doctrine of judicial control. Undoubtedly
the small volume of legislation and litigation in the early
years of statehood would make it unlikely that the issue of the
validity of a law would arise often. The personnel of the
court, the lack of resources in the way of legal literature and
the onerous duties imposed upon the members of the supreme
court served to retard the full expression and development of
the doctrine. Of the justices chosen by the first legislature,
Chief Justice Phillips was reported to be an excellent lawyer
but one to whom judicial duties were not congenial. 1 Justice
Reynolds, afterward governor of the state, "a man of little
industry for study and few of the higher qualities for a judge,
Justice Foster, who never took his seat, a thorough-going rascal/
and Justice Brown, a clever politician but in no wise fitted to
be a judge. 4 It could hardly be expected that a body of men
of 3uch attainments would contribute greatly toward extending
the power and influence of the court
,
William Wilson, a young lawyer only twenty-^ive years
old, was appointed in 1819 to take the place of Justice Foster.
During his long service, extending to the adoption of the consti-
tution of 1848, he was regarded by his contemporaries a3 a judge
of upright character and more than ordinary ability. Those
Reynolds succeeded Joseph Phillips as chief justice in 1833,
after which no more changes were made until 1834, when, by the
constitution the general assembly was permitted to reorganize
the court. This was done, William Wilson being chosen as
chief justice and Thomas C. Browne, S. D. Lockwopd and
1. Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois, p. 300. 3. ibid. p.
300. 3. ibid, p. 301. 4. Ford. History of Illinois, p. 313.

s.
Theophilus W. Smith as associate justices. Of the two members
new to the court, Lockwood was from New York and rated highly
as a lawyer and man^ but Smith was little more than a designing
politician and in the legislative season of 1833-3 narrowly
escaped removal from office by the assembly after impeachment
for the corrupt sale of circuit court clerkships. From this
time until the judicial reorganization act of 1840-1 the member-
ship of the court remained unchanged. Of the several justices
chosen, only Wilson and Lockwood were by ability and training
fitted to perform the duties of justices of the supreme court
in a proper manner, and it is significant that until 1841 all
the opinions in case3 in which the validity of an act was ques-
tioned were written by one of these two men.
Reference to the lack of time and information for the
proper consideration of ca3S3 appears in the opinion of Justice
Lockwood in People v. Forquer^ in which it was said that the
judges had made, "all the investigation which the shortness of
time and the almost total absence of law books and other sources
of information will permit." Mr. Sidney Breese, reporter of
the first volume of the supreme court decisions of Illinois,
writing in 1831, says in his preface: "If any apology is neces-
sary for the court, whose decisions compose this volume, it may
be found in the facts that for the last nine years, its sessions
have been held at a place remote from the means of information,
where there is not even an ordinary law library, and no con-
veniences for examination and reflection - that for several
months in each year the judges composing it, are required by
law to perform circuit duties, and that at every other term of
1. Ford",' History of Illinois, p. 313. 2. 1 111. 134 (1836).

7court, they form a part as the council of revision, of the
legislature, so that they are unable to bestow upon the cases
coming under this revision, that care and attention they would
themselves desire, and which judges, under more favorable cir-
cumstances could bestow". Thus it appears that the court was
hampered by a lack of legal information, by reason of duties
outside of its function as the supreme court of the state, and
by the lack of legal learning in the justices themselves. Con-
sequently, what might be reasonably implied from these condit-
ions came to pass, the court, thus hindered, was slow to make
any advances and preferred to follow in the wake rather than
to endeavor to be in the van of judicial action. TIence we find
in the early years of the court's history the power to declare
laws unconstitutional before the development of a consistent
theory justifying the exercise of such power or determining its
1 imits
.
Prior to 1840 the validity of legislative acts was passed
upon in but six cases and these concerned but four laws, one
of them a territorial enactment. In eac'i of these cases the
determination of the validity of the act in question was nec-
essary to a decision of the case. In one case"5" the right to
present an issue of invalidity was denied because it was found
possible to decide the controversy on other grounds.
The earliest expression of the court's attitude occurs in
o
the case of Phoebe v. Jays, decided in 1828. In this case Pho-
ebe, a negress, sought release from Jays, to whose father she
had been bound as an indentured servant. The ri^ht to indenture
colored servants was claimed uncLer an act of the territory of
1. Snyder v. President and directors of the Bank of Illinois,
1 111. 161(1826). 2. 1 111. 268(1828).

Indiana of 1807, continued in force by the territory of Illi-
nois. rnhis act the court held void as violative of the Ordin-
ance of 1787, holding that while the acceptance of the state
constitution abrogated so much of the Ordinance as conflicted
with it, otherwise the Ordinance was in force. TTowever, while
the ordinance was held void, the court ruled that a provision
of the constitution continued its provisions in effect, nnd
thus while declaring the law void, virtually upheld it. "he
court said: "any number of repetitions of unconstitutional acts
or acts beyond the pale of their authority, can never make the
original act valid" but " although the act of the territory in
relation to indenturing negroes and mulattoes, was originally
void, yet it enumerated a description of persons" that the
constitution had recognized and provided for; and accordingly
the court held that the indentured persons should serve accor-
ding to the terms of the void act. This necessarily demanded a
statement of the court's attitude toward the laws of the state
which would justify their stand. Accordingly the court paid:
"Prom the decrees of the constitution there can be no appeal,
for it emanates from the highest source of power, the sover-
eign people. Whatever condition is assigned to any portion of
the constitution is irrevocably fixed, however unjust in nrin-
ciple it may be. mhe constitution can establish no tribunal
with power to abolish that which gave and continues such trib-
unal in existence. But a legislative act is the will of the
people in a derivative and subordinate capacity . The constitu-
tion is their commi ss i on , and they must act within the pale of
their outhority, ^nd all their acts, contrary or in violation
of the constitutional charter, are void".

9" hether this doctrine was influenced by the opinions of the
judges upon the slavery question does not appear, though it is
very possible that the fact that three of the four judges of
the supreme court were ardent pro-slavery workers may have in-
fluenced the decision. Nevertheless, it may be said, that the
court by this opinion is committed to the principle that the
constitution is paramount and that the court has the authority
to declare acts conflicting vith it unconstitutional and void.
In Linn v. President and directors of the State Bank of
Illinois, 1 decided in 1833, the supreme court in deciding that
the incorporation act of the Rtate bank was invalid so far as
related to the prohibition in the constitution of the nited
States of the emission of bills of credit by the states, clear
-ly recognized the doctrine of judicial control in the follow-
ing;"This court recognizes the correctness of the doctrine that
the Supreme Court of the United States is the proper and const-
itutional forum to decide and finally to determine all suits
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an
authority exercised under any state, on the ground of its be-
ing repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of such validity''.
In harmony with this statement the court rendered judgment in
accordance with a previous decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This case, it will be noted confines itself to
to the recognition of the principle of judicial control on fed-
eral grounds only and gives little that may be taken as a con-
sistent statement of the court's general attitude toward the
principle of the judicial power to declare laws unconsti tution-
1
. 2 111. 87(1833}

10.
al . It is apparent that the stand here taken was intended mere-
ly for the settlement of the particular case before the court.
In the legislative session of 1840-1 the Democrats were
in full control and sought to change the court from a Whig to
a Democratic body. Accordingly a law was passed over the
protest of the council of revision putting the judges back on
circuit duties for a portion of the time as they had been prior
to 1834, on the ostensible plea that such action was necessary
to elevate the supreme court to a position of importance equal
with that of the governor or legislature. Five new justicea
7/ere added, all Democratea, raising the total to nine. The new-
ly constituted court at once began a more vigorous use of its
powers. In Sawyer v. City of Alton-*- in upholding the validity
of a section of the charter of the city of Alton the court an-
nounced the now familiar doctrine that the constitution wa3 not
a grant of power but a limitation on the legislature, and soon
after in Lane v. Dorraan3 held void a law authorizing the sale
of lands of a deceased person on the ground that it constituted
an invasion of judicial powers. In the next year an act
authorizing the commissioners of sale of certain lands to set
aside a widow's dower in such lands was upheld as was also a
law empowering a guardian to sell and convey certain of her
ward's property. 3
Accompanying the increased use of the court's powers
came more discission of the principle of judicial control, and
in Lane v. Dorman the court set out fully the attitude of that
body: "The determination of a question involving the inquiry
whether an exercise __of power by the legislative department i s
T. 3 Scam. (Ill) 126 (1841). 3. 4 111. 337 (1841). 3. 4 111. 464
(1843); Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam. 137 (1842).
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constitutional, is readily conceded to be not only a matter of
delicacy but of grave import, and demands the moat deliberate
and mature consideration. It should not, moreover, be decided
but in cases of clear necessity and where the character of the
act done is in plain and obvious conflict with the constitution.
It has been aptly said to be an enquiry 'whether the will of
the representatives, as expressed in the law, is or i3 not in
conflict with the will of the people as expressed in the con-
stitution. ' If the case presented can upon its merits, be
determined without such enquiry, it is the part of wisdom to
decline it. So on the other hand, although it is the highest
and most solemn function which the judicial power can be called
on to exercise, it should be met with firmness, when in the
course of judicial examination, a decision becomes material to
the rights of either of the parties in the controversy. Wher-
ever it is clear that the legislature has transcended its
authority, and that a legislative act is in conflict with the
constitution, it is imperatively required of the court to main-
tain the paramount authority of that instrument, which it is
solumnly pledged to support, and to declare the act inoperative
and void .
"
Here, then, is the first clear and authoritative pro-
nouncement of the court as to its policy relative to the validity
of laws and this doctrine is followed carefully through the re-
mainder of the period with which we are dealing. In Edwards v.
Pope 1 the court adds to the above statement by refusing to pass
upon matters of legislative discretion within the scope of their
constitutional authority and in Bradley v. Case 3 the right
1 . 4" 111. 464 TT842')7 27 4 111" . 585 (1842) .

12
o r the court to pass upon the validity of federal laws is aff-
irmed .
In People ex rel Stickney v. Marshall in upholding the
charter of the Bank of Illinois, the court expands its former
statements somewhat and expresses a theory as to presumptions
in favor of a law's validity. Thus the principle of resolving
all reasonable doubt in favor of the law is stated as; "in a
ca.se that admits of doubt, and when as in this case, the prin-
cipal arguments are drawn from historical reminiscences, and
the impolicy of banking corporations generally, the views of
the court ought not to be so restricted as to exclude all con-
siderations as to the consequences of a decision aga.inst the
validity of the law, particularly when their character and
magnitude are such as must follow a decision of this case".
Equal moderation in passing upon the constitutionality of laws
appears in the case of Mills v. County of St. Clair^ in which
the court upheld by construction an act authorizing St. Clair
county to establish a ferry, saying: "^e have endeavored not to
make the law, but decide it as it is".
3In the last case arising under the constitution of 1618 in
upholding certain revenue laws the supreme court affirmed the
previous doctrine of the court^ and gave voice to a strong ad-
herence to the principle of stare decisis: "We repeat, therefore
I that the repeated ratification of the constitutionality of the
law by the several departments of the government, the long
practice under it by its officers, with the acquiescence and
I approval of the entire communi ty , followed up as it has been
by a solemn adjudication of the supreme court, corresponding
1. 1 Cilm.(Ill.) 672(1844). 2. 7 111. 197(1843). 3. Bruce v.
Schuyler, 9 111. 231(1847).
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with the sense and approbation of the government and people
thus indicated, must be regarded as having definitely settled
j this question. From these considerations, we are disposed to
adhere to the law as already settled, even though we might re-
gard some of its provisions of a doubtful character, if recent-
ly enacted. Put among the most valuable attributes of a writ-
ten constitution are certainty and uniformity; without these it
can afford neither confidence nor security. It will change with
the individual opinions of the judges, as they may succeed each
other on the bench. The prior decisions will furnish no guide
for the future and all will be uncertainty and doubt".
From the foregoing discussion it appears that prior to the
reorganization of the court in 1840-1 the supreme court passed
upon the validity of laws, without however, any well defined
doctrine except what would be found in a recognition of the
theory of Chief Justice Farshall of the United States Supreme
Court. So far as state legislation was concerned no theory was
worked out. After 1840, however, we find a clearly stated doc-
trine which regards the constitution as a limitation on the
powers of the legislature, regards it as the duty of the court
-
to pass upon the validity of laws when the rights of partier to
a suit are thereby involved and holds it the duty of the court
to prevent the encroachment by the legislature upon the exec-
utive and judicial departments. The doctrine developed by the
court further contemplates resolving all reasonable doubt in
favor of the validity of the law, -Mfr taking cognizance of ex-
isting facts and the effect of a declaration that a law is
void, and adhering to settled rules of decision.
The independence of the court, developed so well in its

14
utterances in c^ses relating to the constitutionality of laws,
does not otherwise so clearly appear. During the period under
consideration the judges were chosen by the general assembly
and almost without exception upon political grounds. "Before
1830 no real party division had taken place in Illinois, yet
there was a very real division over the matter of slavery. In
the case of Phoebe v. Jays, followed in Choisser v. Hargrave"'",
o
and Borders v. Bor^rs^', relative to the indenturing of negro
servants, and in Millard v. People" and Eells v. People
,
in
affirming a law which made the harboring of fugitive slaves a
misdemeanor, the court followed the will of the legislature. In
upholding the charter of the Bank of Illinois in People ex rel
Stickney v. Marshall
,
and in questions involving the validity
of revenue laws, and with one exception, in the case of spec-
ial acts- the court did not oppose the majority of the assembly
members. The extent of the agreement of the court with the leg-
islative results of the period 1818-48 will appear from a con-
sideration of the number of cases in which act'^ were upheld or
declared void during this time. During this constitutional per-
iod the issue of invalidity of acts arose in twenty-nine cases,
involving seventeen laws. In but seven of these cases were acts
held void and they involved only four laws, two being declared
invalid on federal grounds and two as violating the state con-
stitution. Cf the latter, however, the action in one case
amounted to a restatement of the court's theory of the separa-
tion of powers with the assertion of a stricter view of the
independence of the judiciary than the one expressed in the
earlier case of Field v. People.
r__^____
1.2 111. 317(1836). 2. 5 111. 542(1643). 3. 5 111. 461(1843)
4. 5 111. 498(1843). 5. 1 Oilm.(Ill) 672(1844)

In the only other case in which the court held an act void,
on state constitutional grounds, a resolution of the general
assembly was held invalid because it had not passed the requi-
site number of readings in the house and had not been submitted
to the council of revision 1 . Interest attaches here to the in-
fluence of the council of revision in controlling legislation.
Aside from the case just cited and an expression in People ex
rel Stickney v. Marshall that" it does not necessarily follow
that a law which
,
as legislators we might decline voting for
because of prudential doubts, we ought, as a court to declare
void", no reference is made in the opinions of the court to the
exercise of control over 1 erisln.tion by the judges as members
of the council of revision. The fact that so few laws were held
void and that more than three fourths of the laws sought to be
challenged a.s invalid were affirmed by the court indicates but
little more than that the court was not ill-disposed toward the
general assembly. It is likely that in most of these cases the
court simply affirmed what had already been expressed by the
justices as members of the council of revision. This, however,
could be ascertained only b,, an examination of the opinions of
the council of revision, an undertaking which would be very
difficult because of the scattered sources of this material.
The fact that the legislature might, as indeed it did in the
case of the judiciary reorganization act of 1840-1, re-pass a
law over the objection of the council of revision would tend
to show that the power of the judges as members of the council
was not great when the court was not in political harmony with
the legislature. Justices on circuit usually upheld laws con-
1. People ex rel Washburne v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. (111.) 466(1846;
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tested before them on the ground of invalidity, and with but
a single exception, the supreme court on appeal affirmed the
judgment of the justice sitting as a circuit judge. On the
whole, the probable effect of the council of revision was to
weaken materially the case against a law when brought later
before the same men sitting as a court, '''here justices had
as a council of revision once approved a law they would incline
toward a. second affirmation, and in the case of laws pasred
over their protest, for prudential reasons would, trend toward
acquiescence in the legislative judgment.
To recapitulate, the period 1818-46 shows a development
from non-use of the idea of judicial control to a doctrine
affirming the right in clear and strong terns, ^'he opinions of
the court show no hostility toward legislation but rather ac-
quiescence in the legislative results of the general assembly
when those results were challenged in the court. This was due,
in part perhaps, to the po-'er of the legislature to fix the
tenure of justices and to impeach them. In short, it was a
period of beginnings, of little significance so far as the con-
trol over legislation is concerned, and valuable chiefly in
furnishing the statement in main outline of the doctrine of
the Illinois Supreme Court, under which in later years, a much
more extensive control over legislation was brought about.

17
Judicial Control of legislation, 1848-1870.
The constitution adopted by a vote of the people on Mar. 7,
1848 abolished the council of revision created under the first
constitution. The provision regarding the separation of powers
was retained in almost identical language**", stipulating in add-
ition, however, that all acts in contravention therewith were
void. Since the power to declare laws unconstitutional had
been exercised without opposition under the constitution of
1818 the declaration that all acts violative of the principle
of the separation of powers should be void may properly be
regarded as a recognition of the principle of judicial control.
Aside from this the constitution of 1848 contained no express
recognition of the judicial power to declare laws unconstitut-
ional. The specific limitations upon legislation in this con-
stitution were much greater in number than those found in the
constitution of 1818. This may be considered as an implied
recognition of judicial control for, though it is nowhere made
the duty of any governmental body to enforce these limitations,
in view of the previous exercise of the judicial power to de-
clare laws unconstitutional, it was probably thought that the
court would make effective these restrictions.
By the constitution of 1648 the supreme court was to con-
sist of three judges of whom two should constitute a quorum
and the concurrence of two judges was declared to be necessary
to a decision.*" The court was given original jurisdiction in
cases relative to the revenue, in cases of mandamus, habeas
corpus, and such impeachment cases as might by law be directed
1. Constitution of Illinois, 1848, Art. II. sees. 1,2.
2. Constitution of Illinois, 1848, Art. V. sees. 1,2.

18.
to be tried before it. Appellate jurisdiction was given in all
other cases. 1 The judges were to be elected from districts
created for that purpose, and were to have a nine year tenure,
although in the case of a vacancy during the term of any justice
the governor was empowered to appoint a justice for a period
of less than one year. 2 The chief change in the constitution
of 1848 from that of 1818 in the organization of the court lay
in its provision for the election of the judges by the people
instead of by the general assembly as was the case in the pre-
vious constitutional period.
The significant change in the constitutional period 1848-
70 is found in the constitutional limitations upon legislation
placed in the constitution rather than in the affirmative action
of the court. Under the constitution of 1818 the legislature
enjoyed almost unrestricted power as a consequence of which
some undesirable legislation had been enacted. At the adoption
of the constitution of 1848 the state was recovering from the
unpleasant effects of extravagant internal improvement ventures
and from the irresponsible action of the state bank. Although
the evils suffered as a result of unwise legislation in these
matters were already disappearing, the constitution makers
sought to guard against future danger.
Accordingly we find numerous restrictions upon legisla-
tive action in the constitution of 1848. In the judiciary ar-
ticles it is required that inferior courts established by law
shall have uniform jurisdiction and in the article upon the legis-
lature4 there is a requirement that legislative districts shall
r^re^sent contiguous territory bounded by county lines. The
1. Const . "111'." 1848, Art. V, sec. 5, 2. Ibid'.' Art . V. sec. III.
3. Ibid. Art. V, 4. Ibid., Art. III.
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formation of new counties was limited by the requirements that
the remaining county after division should contain not less
than four hundred square miles, that no new county be created,
without a favorable vote of the voters of the county affected,
and that no county seat be removed unless the point of removal
is fixed by law and. approved by a majority of the voters of the
county, township organization laws also were to take effect
only upon affirmation by a majority of the voters in the county
voting upon such adoption. 1
With respect to revenue laws it was required that all taxes
should be by valuation in proportion to the amount of property,
that taxes be uniform as to local subdivisions of the state and
be levied by corporate authorities. A two mill tax was author-
ized, the proceeds of which were to be applied to the state debt
o
other than canal and school indebtedness . The legislature was
limited to the available amount of revenue in its biennial app
J
ropriations. A debt of $50,000 might be contracted to meet cas-
ual deficits but such money must be applied to the purpose for
which borrowed and no other debt aside from a war debt might be
contracted. Acts appropriating money for salaries of official-
Is might not contain provisions on other subjects. 4
The validity of acts was also dependent upon certain tech-
nical requirements as to procedure. Bills were to be passed
by the ayes and noes on the final vote, were required to be
rea.d three tirres unless such reading was dispensed with by a
three-fourths vote of the house, and were required to be app-
I
roved by a majority of the members - el ect in order to become
valid laws. These steps were to be recorded in the house jour-
1. Const. 111,1848, Art. III. 2. Ibid, Art. IX. 3. Ibid, Art.
Ill, sec. 57. 4. Ibid. Art. Ill, sec. 22.
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rials. 1 All acts were to be signed by the speakers of both hous-
es and transmitted to the governor who had the right to veto
measures, though his veto could be overcome by a majority vote
of all the members elected to the general assembly. Should the
governor not return bills within ten days they became laws re-
gardless of any later action by him." No measures v/ere to take
effect until sixty days after the adjournment of the assembly
unless that body had declared an emergency to exist.
Further restrictions applied to special acts. Fvery private
or local law was required to have but one subject which was to
3be properly expresred in the title. The assembly was forbidden
to pass private or special acts authorizing the sale of real
estate,^ to give the credit of the state to any individual,
association or corporation, to grant extra co-npensntion to any
public official, employee or contractor after the service or
contract had been performed,^ or to grant divorces although by
uniform laws courts might be empowered to do so. Further pro-
hibitions were directed against the authorization of lotteries, J
the revival of the state bank or the ownership of or liability
for stock by the state in any corporation or joint stock com-
pany created for banking purposes. Acts authorizing banking
corporations were required to be submitted to the people for
approval at the next general election. Cornorati ons not noss-
essing banking powers were not to be created by special acts
unless in the judgment of the assembly the object of the cor-
poration could not be attained under a general law.
Jjli£jS wer e .the ^r es tricti ons which hedged about legisl ative _
1. Constitution of Illinois, 1846, Ar t . 1 1 1 , sees . 21, 23.
2. Ibid., Art. IV, sec. 21. 3. Ibid., Art. Ill, sec 23. 4. Ibid
Art. Ill, sec 36. 5. Ibid, Art. Ill, sec. 38. 6. Ibid., Art. Ill,
sec. 33. 7. Ibid. Art. Ill, sec. 32. 8. Ibid. Art. Ill, sec. 35
..JSL^J3lid^,Axt^X^ s e c . 1
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action. Their effectiveness and importance in extending the
power of the supreme court over legislation may be judged from
the fact that nearly every one of these limitations was invoked
during the period 1848-70 in controversies concerning the
validity of laws. The greatest development lay in the re-
striction of special laws though important extensions were
created through other constitutional provisions.
In enforcing the limitations of the constitution upon
legislative action the court developed a strong position in
maintaining the principle of the separation of powers and in re-
fusing to permit the legislature to exercise control over the
judiciary. In Shaw v. Dennis, 1 a case decided in 1849, an act
of 1847 authorizing the levying of a special tax in Rockford
precinct for the purpose of maintaining a bridge across Rock
River was upheld as not a judicial determination that there
debts due some persons, and in Parmalee v. Lawrence, 2 decided
in 1868, an act fixing rates of interest was sustained on like
grounds. However, in Davenport v. Young, 3 a special act author-
izing the sale of real estate of the estate of a deceased per-
son, and in Rozier v. Fagan, 4 a similar act of 1833, were held
void (following Lane v. Dorman) as judicial determinations that
there were debt3 due certain persons. Since special acts of
the latter character were expressly forbidden by the constitution
of 1848, these decisions may seem to indicate little. They
reveal though, at least no tendency to uphold legislative acts
which were judicial in their nature. A much stronger indica-
tion is found in Darst v. People, 5 decided in 1839, in which
the court held void an ordinance of the city of Eureka^
_
1. 10 111. 405. 3. 48 111. "331. 3. 16 111. 458~Tl855r 47 46 "ill
.
404 (1868). 5. 51 111. 386.
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declaring to be a nuisance all intoxicating liquor kept in the
city for purposes of gift or sale as a "beverage, and directing
the police officers to abate the nuisance. r,his act the court
said was judicial in character and the ordinance therefore
void.
Tn the matter of court jurisdiction and procedure the court
maintained a firm position. An act establishing a recorders
court for the cities of LaSalle and Peru was held void in Peo-
ple ex rel Beebe v. Evans 1 ( 1857 ) as violating the requirement
that inferior courts must have uniform jurisdiction. In Holmes
v. Pihlenburg <3 (l870) an act of 1869 crating the court of com-
mon pleas of Sparta was upheld only by refusing to give effect
to its summons beyond city limits. In People ex rel "Ballou v.
Dubois, Audi tor 3 ( 18C0) an act of 1869 reconstituting the twenty
third judicial district was held void as an attempt by the
legislature to expel a judge by creating a new district in vio-
lation of the requirements of the judiciary article. In Hall v.
Marks (1864) an act of 1353 regulating the practice in the
thirteenth judicial district and giving the clerk of the court
power to grant judgments by default in vacation wan held void
because the clerk was not a judicial officer. Acts regulating
the practice of inferior courts were upheld in McDonnell v. Ot-
well'~(l856) and Lansing v. Hunter ( 1861 ) ; and in Board of Sup-
ervisors of Bureau County v. Chicago, Burlington and Q,uincy
Railroad Company ^ ( 186 7 ) an act of 1861 permitting an appeal to
the circuit court from the assessment valuations of the board
of assessors was upheld as to such appeal though it was conten-
ded that an ap
p
e al c ou1 d not JL ie from the bo ard because it was^
1. 18 111. 361. 2. 54 111. 283. 3. 23 111. 498. ~4. 34 111. 358.
5. 17 111. 375. 6. 25 [11. 247. 7. 44 111. 279.
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not a court.
On the whole, these cases point to a determination by
the court to preserve the equal and independent position of the
judiciary, with a fair regard for proper legislative action.
The separate position of the judiciary is firmly fixed, and its
constitutional rights maintained, by the assertion of judicial
control over legislation affecting courts.
The independent and strengthened position of the court
will be seen in its control over legislative acts seeking to
delegate authority. While in People ex rel Caldwell v. Rey-
noldsl the court upheld an act of 1847 authorizing a county
division by a local vote of the county affected, approving the
right of the legislature to pass special acts to take effect
upon an affirmative vote of the locality affected, two years
later, an act of 1349 providing for township organization upon
adoption at an election by a majority of those voting was held
void because a majority of the total number of voters of the
county were required to give effect to the act. 2 in People
ex rel Mitchell v. Warfield^ a similar act was upheld only
because the court deliberately disregarded the plain terms of
the act and construed it in accordance with constitutional de-
mands. In Harward v. St. Clair and Monroe Levee and Drainage
Company^ an act authorizing drainage commissioners to assess
taxes was held void because not permitting the district affected
to express its will upon the matter. In other cases ordinances
and acts delegating legislative or judicial power to municipal
officials was declared unconstitutional. 5 Thus the court while
(loc-
assuming a liberal attitude toward legislation left subject to_
1. 10 111. 1. 2. People v. Brown, 11 111. 479. 3. 30 111. 160.
4. 51 111. 130 (1869). 5. 53 111. 303, 50 111. 38, 51 111. 354.
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al approval for its operation has consistently held the leg-
islature within its constitutional honds and enforced strict
compliance with constitutional limitations.
The earliest expression of the cart's attitude during this
period in passing upon the validity of laws occurs in People ex
rel Billings v. Bissell, Governor} in which case it was sought
to compel the governor to issue certain bonds under an act of
the legislature. Chief Justice C fiton speaking for the court
said; "To the judiciary is confided the power and the duty of
interpreting the laws and the constitution, whenever they are
judicially presented for consideration. Hence it becomes our
duty to determine what is the meaning of the laws passed by the
legislature, and also, whether those laws are such as the legia
-lature was authorized by the constitution to pass", and again,
"we may not enjoin the others Q. egi slat ive and e/e utive depart-
mental from doing an unconstitutional act, but by refusing to
give effect to such act, or relieving against it, when proper-
ly and judicially applied to for that purpose, we may restrain
them". It is apparent from this that the court clearly consid-
ers the power to pass upon the validity of laws as definitely
established. Justice Creese in rendering the opinion in People
2
ex rel Merchants Savings, Loan and Trust Company v. Auditor,"
o. mandamus action to compel the auditor to ignore the constit-
utional restriction upon the use of the two mill tax and appor-
tion its proceeds among the state creditors as provided by an
act of 1861jgives voice to a similar view tempered by express-
ions of reluctance to pass upon the validity of laws. mhus he
t
sai_d : "W e always approach questions of this nature 'vith relucta-
~ i? i J hit 2:;9.2. 3 irrr^ggUBGS)
Lin
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nee, nnd with great diffidence, for the legislature is a co-
ordinate department of the government, whose exclusive province
it is to make laws . But the constitution is supreme over all
the departments of the government, -rid it is for the judiciary
so to declare, and to briiig all enactments of the legislature
to that standard- to test them by its provisions, when a ques-
tion is made touching their validity, always remembering, that
only in a clear and palpable case will the courts pronounce a-
gainst the validity of an enactment. If it is doubtful, the
doubt is usually solved, and should be, in favor of the legis-
lative power" . However, if reluctant, the court was none the le
-ss firm in its position
,
for the opinion continues : "No pre-
text, whatever, can be an apology for unconstitutional enact-
ments, and they seldom find favor with those they are design-
ed to conciliate. Private distress, great financial embarrass-
ments, even a public calamity, are held by a just people as
airy nothings, when weighed against the high behests of the
constitution." Similar expressions by .Justice Breese are found
in Board of Supervisors of Bureau County v. Chicago, "Burling-
ton and Q,uincy Railroad Company^- and in Bunn v. People ex rel
pLaflin
. In the latter case the court upheld an act providing
for the erection of a new state house. Justice Lawrence, how-
ever dissented, and in so doing voiced his regard for the par-
amount character of the constitution : "If 3 new state house is
desirable another legislature can direct it to be built, but
let them do so without trampling upon the constitution." Prom
the opinions of Justice Breese given above and that of Justice
C at on in the Bissell case the attitude o f the cour t appears to
1. 44111 .2291 1867) 2'7'ZE 111. 297(1867)
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be one of unquestioning assumption of the power to pass upon
the constitutionality of laws as an essential right of the ju-
diciary. That the court will not hesitate to use this power
also appears though in doubtful cases the presumption is in favor
of the law. Apparently there is little advance in position
here over the previous constitutional period, except in the
security and assuredness of the court in expressing its opinions.
The attitude of the court is better shown in the readi-
ness with which it sought to revise and interpret legislation.
In People v. Thurber^- in upholding a statute requiring license
fees from agents of foreign insurance companies the court said,
in speaking of the method of collection provided in the act:
"Although it is to be regretted that the legislature has not
by express and plain enactment, superseded the necessity of
construction, in a matter so important in its results, yet this
court will not in such cs.se hesitate to declare the law to be
what the legislature most palpably intended it should be." In
People ex rel Manier v. CouchmanS the court declared void an
act because, though it conformed to the letter of the consti-
tution, it violated the spirit of a provision thereof. In this
case an act providing for the doing away with township organiza-
tion by a majority of the vote case at an election authorized
for such purpose was claimed to violate the reasonable inter-
pretation of the constitutional requirement for the adoption
of township organization by a majority of all the voters of
the county. Justice Caton speaking for the court said: "VJe do
not think the legislature had the power to allow a county to
abolish township organization when it had been adopted in the'v °on
'
3 7 13 I'll." 554 Tl85t)"~2. 15 111. 143. ' ~"
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stitutional mode, in a way less solemn or with different form-
alities or safeguards to secure the most deliberate action of
the people than the constitution required should be observed
in its adoption." Although the constitution of 1848 is silent
upon the matter of the abandonment of township organization,
the court here ruled that any law having that purpose must be
of equal requirement with the constitutional provision for its
adoption. In People ex rel itchell v. Warfield the court up-
held an act providing for a similar submission of the question
of township organization by refusing to regard the plain terms
of the act and reading the act in the light of the limitations
of the constitution. Though, no doubt, beneficial effects en-
sued in these cases, they nevertheless emphasized the power of
the court to exercise a control over legislation amounting to
the ability to reconstruct laws, for the purpose of either up-
holding them or declaring them void.
In the control of the court over special legislation a
marked contrast is seen in the opinions of Justices Caton and
Breese, the former strongly inclining to-ard a liberal attitude
in passing upon the constitutionality of such lavs and the lat-
ter definitely opposed to the enactment of special and local
p
acts. In Firemen's Benevolent Association v. Lounsbury the
court upheld an act creating the Firenen's Benevolent Associat-
ion and requiring the agents of foreign insurance companies
to pay two per cent upon all premiums collected, to the treasu-
rer of thfi^ ssociat i on for its use. Justice 3aton in giving the
opinion of the court ascribed to the legislature a broad range
of power inclu
d
ing, "any law ~'M ch could be enacted in th e_ mo st
1. 20 111. 1600-853) . 2. 21 111. 511(1859]
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despotic government", "everything "Thich the people could enact
in their primary capacity" and ''anything which they would have
right to embody in the constitution itself" . To the charge that
the exercise of legislative power in this case was unwarranted,
he replied: "To deprive the legislature of this power would to
a great extent destroy its usefulness- while it would to a cer-
tain extent deprive it of the power of abuse, it would destroy
its power to regulate by law a thousand things, which the pub-
lic good requires should be regulated by law". And to <&eny the
power would bring the state to the "brink of anarchy" and "let
loose uhon society ten thousand evils, which in every well re-
gulated community it has always been the duty of the legisla-
ture to suppress." Later in People ex rel Chittenden v. Miller
in holding void a special act relating to the school funds of
the city of Warsaw, Justice Caton paid: "We have hesitated long
and anxiously considered the case before declaring our convic-
tion that this law cannot be sustained under our constitution".
In O'Leary v. Cook County Justice Caton again upheld a special
law, in this case an amendment to the incorporation act of ror-
thwestern University forbidding the sale of liquor within four
miles of the institution's grounds, holding that to declare the
act void would tie the hands of the legislature. Justice Breese
dissented strongly claiming that such acts were attempts to
assist local interests at the expense of the public. The atti-
tude of Justice Breese as well^as the prevailing practice is
expressed in the opinion in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Rail-
road Company in which in upholding an act granting the use of
the r i ght of eminent domain to the railroad company, he said
1.32 111. 181(1863). 2. 28 1117 534(1862). 3. 23 111. 124(18597
L __. ^
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answering an objection that a general law would do as well^:
"It is too late now to make this objection since, by the action
of the general assembly under this clause, special acts have
been too long the order of the day and the ruling passion with
every legislature which has convened under the constitution,
until their acts fill a huge and misshapen volume, and important
and valuable rights are claimed under them. That clause
has been wholly disregarded and it would now produce far-
spread ruin, to declare such acts unconstitutional and void."
Later in the opinion this appears: ... now our special legis-
lation and its mischiefs are beyond recovery or remedy." In
this particular evidently the control of the court had failed
through the weak character of a constitutional limitation which
forbade special acts creating corporations but permitted them
if in the judgment of the assembly it was thought that the pur-
pose of the corporation could not be accomplished under a gen-
eral law. In other cases, however, special legislation was
forbidden without any qualification and in enforcing these
provisions the court established a strong control over special
acts
.
The extent and importance of the control over special legis-
lation will appear from an analysis of the cases in which the
issue of invalidity arose during this period. Of the 111
cases in which the validity of acts was called in question, 65 were
concerned with special and local acts. Of the 46 remaining
cases, 10 dealt with municipal ordinances and one with a federal
statute, leaving only 35 cases in which general state laws were
passed upon. Thus of the_cases in which state laws were passed
1. Constitution" of Illinois,"1848, Art. X. Corporations, sec. 1.
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upon in this period nearly twice as many were concerned with
special as with general acts. A further examination of the cas-
es in which special acts were passed upon shows that the con-
trol was general rather than being confined to one or two clas-
ses of acts, "hus of the 65 cases, 11 were concerned with ques-
tions of county organization, change of county seats and the
formation of new counties, 13 cases related to the revenue and
taxing power of local bodies, 15 to the powers of municipal
corporations, one to a banking corporation, and 12 to corpor-
ations other than banking. Seven were concerned with court
practice and procedure in particular courts and scattering cas-
es related to curative acts, acts for the sale of real estate,
local improvements and assembly privileges. It appears from
this that the one significant development of this period was
the control over special legislation- made effective through
the action of the constitution makers of 1847.
In several cases the court showed a willingness to pass
upon the validity of laws whether the isrue of validity was
essential to a determination of the case or not. In Whitehurst
v. Coleen 1 the court in referring to the issue of validity
raised, said: "We might infer that the appellant had abandoned
this point, as he has failed to point out what portions of
these actions are supposed to have been violated in the pro-
ceeding, and. only refers the court to them and to two cases in
which a different state of facts was presented. But the ques-
tion having been raised, we shall proceed to dispose of it."
In Lovingston v. Wider the court went somewhat further: "We
have decided th e main question(ConstitutioriGlity) because the
1. 53 111. 247(1870). 2. 53 111. 302(1670)
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pleadings were designed to present it, and it has been fully
argued, and it is manifestly very important to the people of
I
East St. Louis that it should be decided without the delay of
a new proceeding and further litigation." In neither case was
the decision of the constitutionality of the act concerned nec-
essary to a decision, yet for the reasons assigned the court
preferred to decide the issue. While a very late development
in this period, it marks a distinct tendency of the court to
widen its opportunities for passing upon the validity of laws.
An even more significant development in the widening of
the scooe of judicial control is found in the passage upon the
validity of acts upon purely technical grounds relating to the
procedure required by the constitution in the enactment of
laws. In Spangler v. Jacoby 1 a special act was held void be-
cause the house journals failed to show that the bill had been
!read three times in the house and the ayes and noes called for,
the court holding that it was competent to go behind a printed
statute and show from the house journals that the law was in-
correctly passed. The signatures of the speakers of both hous-
es and the governor were held not to be conclusive evidence
but merely a presumption in favor of the validity of the meas-
o
ure. ^his rule was followed in Prescott v. Soard of Trustees ,
but modified ir Turley v. Logan County*" where it was held that
the legislature might after the passage of the act amend the
journals to correct any mistake and thus validate statutes
otherwise void. In People ex rel Harless v. Hatch'* and v'abash
l 5Railway Company v. Hughes acts were held void as not having
been properly returned by the governor. Th e requirement of hav-
1. 14 111. 297(1653). 2. 19 111. 321(1857). 3. 17 111. 151
(1855). 4. 33 111. 9(1863). 5. 38 111. 174(1865)
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ing the subject properly expressed in the title of acts T5/as
also passed on for in City of Ottawa v. People ex rel Caton
we find a special act authorizing the city of Ottawa to erect
two bridges over the Illinois and Michigan canal upheld as
having the subject properly expressed in the title of the act.
Though not numerous these cases may be said to establish fair-
ly well an extension of judicial control over legislation
through the imposition of constitutional restrictions not pres-
ent in the constitution of 1818.
As to the mode of bringing the issue of unconstitutional-
ity before the court it can hardly be said that any consider-
able disfavor was shown toward attempts to raise the issue by
extraordinary proceedings. On the contrary, there was a con-
siderable and unchecked use of these methods. Of the 111 cases
in which the issue of invalidity was raised in this period, 23
were mandamus actions, 24 injunction suits, 3 quo warranto
proceedings and 2, habeas corpus cases. No objection was made
to the use of these methods of raising the issue of invalid-
ity save in two cases though 50 of the 111 cases in this per-
iod came to the court by one of these methods. In Poard of
Supervisors of Iroquois County v. Keady in a taxpayer's act-
ion to restrain the county officials from removing the county
seat as had been authorized by an act of the legislature, the
court suggested the inappropriate character of the remedy be-
cause: "an act of administration likely to produce taxation is
not ordinarily a matter of private or individual concern; it is
an affair altogether public, and the appropriate remedial pro-
cess aga inst an abuse o f administrative power, tending to tax-
1. 48 111 . 233(1868) . 2. 34 111. 293(1864)
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ation, would seem to be a proceeding in behalf of the state."
In People ex rel "Fitnam v. City of Calesburg1 the court refus-
ed to act in equity in an issue concerning the validity of a
special act authorizing the junction of ^-alesburg and ^est
Halesburg, claiming that the proper proceeding to determine the
controversy was one in quo warranto. It is apparent that the
objections made were not to the use of the extraordinary pro-
ceedings but to the choice made of them and that the court was
not averse to deciding upon the constitutionality of acts when
the question had been raised in other than the ordinary meth-
ods .
The control over legislation exercised in the period 1846-
70 by the supreme court lay largely in the hands of four of the
nine justices who graced the bench during this period. Of the
111 opinions concerned, 29 were written by Justice Walker, 27
by Justice Breese, 20 by Justice Caton, and 16 by Justice Law-
rence, a total of 92. Thus of the whole number but 19 opinions
I
were writtfcll by the other five justices. Aside from the con-
trasting ppinions of Justices Caton and Breese upon the desir-
ability of special legislation the members of the court rhowed
great harmony of opinion upon questions of constitutionality
and this was no doubt a factor in the strength of the control
shown by the court. This strengthened control is seen in the
range of important matters upon which the court ruled. Special
acts, laws regarding the immigration and harboring of slaves,
laws relating to the retail sale of liquor, police regulations
affecting railroads, laws regarding banks and banking, the
right of private way over the lands of another, interest and
1. 48 111.485(1808)
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usury, mechanic'^ lien, occupying claimant's law, laws relating
to court procedure, revenue statutes, and a number of munic-
ipal ordinances relating to the police power, were among the
matters considered.
A survey of the period 1848-70 shows that the rupreme court
made little progresr in the expression of the theory of judic-
ial control over legislation, but considerable progress in its
use. With the growing population and wealth of the state, lit-
igation and legislation increased, and as a consequence of the
many definite limitations upon legislation contained in the
constitution of 1848, the issue of invalidity was raiser! much
oftener than in the previous period. The court too, coped quite
successfully with the increase. Defeated somewhat in meeting
the flood of special legislation which was being poured out by
the legislature, the court nevertheless established a fairly
strong control over legislation. The independent position of
the judiciary was kept secure, and the court adhered consist-
ently to its attitude toward the practice of judicial control.
No hesitation was shown in permitting the use of mandamus, in-
junction and habeas corpus proceedings in raising issues of
validity, nor did the court hesitate in interpreting and con-
c tructing acts at its pleasure and in the use of technical
grounds for holding acts void. mhe period was one of little
theorizing but much action marked by a vigorous growth of the
power and influence of the court in passing on the constitut-
ionality of laws due not to aggresive action on the part of
the ^ourt but to the increased restrictions placed upon legis-
lation by the constitution makers of 1847 . It was a fitting

35
prelude to the increased limitation on legislation found in
the constitution of 1870 and to the more wide spread activity
of later years in the field of judicial control.

36
Judicial Control of Legislation under the Constitution of 1870.
The adoption of a new constitution by the people of Illi-
nois in 1870 brought with it important constitutional changes
which measurably increased the judicial control over legisla-
tion. Important alterations were made by the constitutional
convention of 1870 in the judiciary article, not without, how-
ever, considerable vigorous debate and opposition. -*- The judic-
ial powers of the state were vested in a supreme court, circuit
courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrat-
es and in such courts as might be created by law in and for
cities and incorporated towns."" In order to relieve the supreme
court of some of the evils of an overburdened docket it was
providedjthat after 1874, inferior appellate courts might be
created to which apneals and writs of error might be prosecut-
ed from circuit and other lower courts, and from which appeals
and writs of error might lie in criminal casc-s, those involv-
ing a franchise or freehold or "the validity of a statute" and
in such other cases as might be provided by law.
in order to oermit the supreme court to "write creditable
opinions", in the language of the address of the convention to
the people, and to enable that body to dispose of more cases the
nu ber of justices was increased from three to seven^ chosen for
a term of nine years by popular election from electoral div-
isions prescribed by the constitution but alterable by the leg-
islature. Original jurisdiction was given to the court in rev-
enue, mandamus and habeas corpus cases and appellate jurisdic-
:< * tion in all others
.
^he concurrence of four judge s ;^a s mad e i
1. Debates, 111. Constitutional Conventd 1870, pp.1129 et seq
2 . Constitution, 111
.
,
1870, Art. VI, sec . 1 .3. Ibid , Art .VI , sec .2.
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necessary to every decision."
An attempt in the constitutional convention of 1870 to give
the court an advisory control over legislation has come to
naught. A section was adopted in the judiciary article requir-
ing all judges of courts of record inferior to the supreme
court to report in writing, annually, to the judges of the lat-
ter body "such defects and omissions in the laws as their ex-
perience may suggest", and requiring the judges of the supreme
court to report in writing to the governor, each year, "such
defects and omissions in the constitution and laws as they may
find to exist, together with appropriate forms of hills to cure
p
such defects and omissions in the laws". No attention was giv-
en to this provision by the courts until 1909 when Governor
Deneen addressed a communication to the judges of the supreme
court requesting the aid of the court in framing a valid pri-
mary law. In answer to the governor's request the justices re-
plied that the aid sought under this provision of the consti-
tution could not properly be secured. Justices Cartv/right and
Carter in addition submitted a comprehensive argument covering
the subject of advisory opinions and requirements that judges
report defects and omissions in the laws.
In view of this controversy and the opinions expressed by
Justices Carter and Cartwright upon the origin of the require-
ment that the judges of the supreme court report defects and
o issions in the constitution and laws to the governor toget-
her with appropriate forms of bills for curing the same, it
will be well to refer to the conditions surrounding its adopt-
ion as a part of the fund amenta! law of the state. 7Carly in th e
1. Const. 111., 1870, Art.VI,secs .2, 6. 2. Ibid, Art.VI, sec. 31.
3. 243 111. pp. 9-41 or Senate &. House Jour .Sp .Sess , 1909-10 , p . 30
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course of the convention a resolution was introduced and adop-
ted requesting the clerk of the supreme court at Ottawa to re-
port concerning what judges had complied with the terms of an
act of Jan. 29, 1869 requiring all circuit judges of the state
to report annually to the supreme court such defects as they
found present in the civil and criminal code and such amend-
ments thereto as might be required by public interest . ^Appar-
ently nothing came of this, for later, another resolution was
adopted calling upon the judges of the supreme court for the
p
same information." ? 7 eanwhile, a resolution, offered by Mr. re-
dill, to the effect that the governor or either branch of the
assembly be authorized to secure advisory opinions from the
"supreme court" upon "constitutional questions of law", was
referred to the judiciary committee. Nothing came of this, for
when the judiciary article was reported no mention was made of
advisory opinions. The provision requiring judges to report
defects and omissions in the laws was
,
however, reported out-
Since this requirement was one new to constitutional law, it
is probable that its origin lay in the statute of 1869 referr-
ed to above.
As to the purpose of the provision little appears. The sec-
tion was adopted without opposition and 'out one delegate, T 'r .
Underwood, attempted an explanation. In setting forth his just-
ification of the section these words appear: 3 "Nov/ there is not
a statute in this state that does not come before the courts
for construction and decision from time to time, and if the in-
ferior courts find that a statute works injustice they can and
should report- that to the judges of the supreme court . "hey
1. Debates, Const. Conv. 1870, p .98. 2. Ibid, 0.323.
3. Ibid, p. 1185.
f
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could select from these reported defects, those manifest ones
that evidently require amendment, and this would very much aid
the legislative department in perfecting our statutes and con-
stitution .
In a wisely constituted government, each department should
aid all the other departments in performing their duties.
Tow the executive of the state is required to communicate
all the information he has of the state of !.he lavs. Why not
the judiciary?" Later in reporting as chairman of the commit-
tee on the address to the people, LTr . T1nderwood said:""7e have
made it the duty of all judges of courts of record to furnish
the general assembly with defects they may discover in our
laws. The performance of this duty with fidelity will enable
the legislature to simplify and perfect our statutes."
It seems from the above a reasonable conclusion that the
provision here concerned had its origin in the statute of 1L69
that it was not intended to establish the practice of advis-
ory opinions, but that it was sought to secure the aid of the
courts in repairing defective laws brought to their notice in
the course of litigation. It seems fair to conclude as well
that the convention intended that the courts should comply with
the requirements of the provision, though it is obvious that
they failed to provide for any means of enforcement. This point
was brought out in the discussion by Justices Carter and Cart-
wright in no uncertain terms: •'-'No authority is conferred upon
either of the other departments by our constitution to require
the judges of the supreme court to report to the governor def-
ects and omissions in the constitution and laws and to draft
1. Senate nnd House Journal, 111, Special Session 1909-10,
p .30 et seq
.

appropriate forms of bills to cure such defects and omissions,
the responsibility of determining when it becomes the consti-
tutional duty of the judges to make a report of the defects and
omissions they find to exist in the constitution and laws rests
upon the judges. No authority is conferred upon any other offic
-er or department of the government to determine that an occas-
ion has arisen requiring such report and demand that it be
made. So far as we are advised, this is the first time in the
history of the state that the Governor has called upon the jud-
ges of the Supreme Court to give their opinion as to the form
of a law proposed to be recommended for adoption that would be
constitutional ." There is no doubt as to the correctness of th-
is statement, but it ill accords with the view of the supreme
court of Illinois that the constitution is paramount and its
mandates obligatory upon the officers of government. Certain-
ly members of a court which has not hesitated to declare inval-
id laws because of a constitutional requirement that all bills
shall be printed before the vote is taken upon their final
passage, should not evade the plain will of thdpeople as enact-
ed in the supreme law of the sta.te.
The same justices interpret the provision requiring the
justices to report defects and omissions in the laws, as foll-
ows : "We do not understand this constitutional provision to con-
template a report to the Governor by the judges except in cases
when in the regula.r course of judicial proceedings questions
are presented to the court for decision involving the constru-
ction and validity of acts of the legislature and it is found
that such acts are not invalid as a whole, but contain defects
or omissions that impair their effectiveness for the purposes

41
for which they are enacted, or make their enforcement product-
ive of results not intended by the legislature. As we under-
stand the constitution, it was never intended that the judic-
ial department of the state should advise another department as
to the desirability or advisability of original legislation
upon any subject not covered by existing laws or as to the con-
stitutionality of proposed legislation." This construction if
used in a liberal sense, and if the supreme court should feel
that it was not above the law, might be productive of much goad
in faciltiating the work of legislation and avoiding unnecess-
ary labor on the part of the assembly. However, reference to
the conditions attending the exchange of communications betwee
-n the governor and the court reveal anything but a liberal
attitude. The governor's request for information and assist-
ance followed the decision of the supreme court in 1G09 in the
case of People ex rel Philip v. Btrassheim, 1 in which the court
2had declared void the entire primary law of 1908 because the
invalidity of sections 11 and 14 made impossible the perform-
ance of the mandate? of the remainder. In an earlier case, the
court had held void the primary law of 1906 for a similar rea-
son.° Had the court been willing to point out v/herein these
sections might be amended and made valid the whole act would
thus have been saved and all the subsequent trouble over pri-
mary legislation obviated.
The real reason for this refusal appears from the further
argument of Justices Cartwright and Carter: "In our view, we
would be transcending our constitutional powers if we should
prepare a form o f act or expr ess our opinion as to the form of
1. 240 111. 279. 2. Laws'~of 111. 1908, p. 148. 3. louse v.
Hiompson, 228 111. 522(1907)^
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an act, for the compulsory nomination of candidates for public
office by a primary election, that would be constitutional. Tf
we can be required to express an opinion an to the form of a
primary election law that would be constitutional, the same re-
quirement could be made of us as to acts relating to many oth-
er subjects. Our constitution never intended that the judge* of
the supreme court should study acts adopted by the legislature
for the purpose of determining whether they contained defects
or omissions, or that they should investigate and study what
forms of acts might be adopted upon subjects not already cov-
ered by existing legislation, and make report thereof to the
governor. mhis seems apparent to us from the language of the
constitution, the theory of our form of government of the ind-
ependence of the three departments and also from the fact that
if ,,r e should give an opinion it would be of no binding author-
ity upon either of the departments of the state government and
might be ignored and disregarded by both, "either would i1 be
binding on us, sitting as a court, if the same question should
afterward be presented to us in the regular course of judicial
proceeding involving the rights of parties."
The court thus declined to exercise a control over legis-
lation outside the reg;ular course of litigation, although an
express provision of the constitution would have furnished some
justification for such control . With respect to the more reg-
ular field of judicial procedure, new limitations upon both the
manner and the substance of legislative actions, introduced
into the constitution by the convention of 1870, augmented
greatly the control of the courts over legislation.
The right of the supreme court to pass upon the constitut-
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ionality of laws was recognized without question "by the conv-
ention. A resolution was introduced early in the deliberations
of that body"1" providing" that the supreme court alone, shall
have power to decide questions arising upon the constitution-
ality of any act of the legislature; a.nd that no act of the
legislature shall be declared unconstitutional by the supreme
court, except upon the unanimous concurrence of all the judges
therof." This resolution v/as referred to the judiciary comm-
ittee but v/as never reported out. The right of passing upon the
constitutionality of laws, thus was not denied to lower courts
with competent original jurisdiction, and the constitutional
provision giving circuit courts original jurisdiction in all
causes in law and equity inferentially confirmed a practice in
operation in the previous constitutional periods. By the con-
stitution the general assembly was authorized to establish
appellate courts from which appeals m&gbt be taken to the sup-
reme cort in cases involving the validity of a statute.*' ^hen,
however, the assembly created such courts the righAto pass
upon the validity of acts was denied the appellate courts and
it was directed that in such cases appeals should be taken
directly from, the court of original jurisdiction to the supreme
court. ^ The action of the lower courts in passing upon the val-
idity of laws has rarely been important and the present prac-
tice of trial courts has become largely to affirm the law call-
ed in question without argument in order to expedite an appeal
or writ of error to the supreme court. While therefore, the
supreme court shares with lower courts the right to determine
the constitutionality of la,v s, its position as the court of
1. Debates Const. Conv. 1870, p. 3121. 2. Const. 111. 1870, Art.
VI, sec 12. 3. Ibid. Art . VI , secll . 4. Laws , 111 , 187 7, p. 69.
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last resort, has made it virtually, if not theoretically, the
real determining body, since in the majority of cases parties
seeking to assail the validity of a law are not content with
the decision of a court which is liable to reversal at any time
on -appeal.
Much of the debate during the constitutional convention
shows distrust of the legislature and a reliance upon the con-
stitutional limitations on legislation and upon the judiciary
to impose needed restraints upon legislative excesses. A stra-
ightforward presentation of this view appears in the address
of the convention to the people. Upon the legislature the add-
ress contains the following: "To avoid partisan injustice in
representative districts, and the expense and delay of the
General Assembly in making them, we have provided for district-
ing the state as in Ohio, by ratio and computation. To guard
against undue influences upon members of the general assembly,
and to afford small counties representatives, we have increas-
ed their number. We have also required a stringent oath again-
st bribery and corruption. To afford security against hasty and
vicious legislation, we have required all bills and amendments
thereto to be printed before they are passed. Only one subject
shall be embraced in each bill, and rhen amendments are made to
laws, or acts are revived, the sections amended and acts rev-
ived must be stated at length. The evils of special and local
legislation have become enormous. The expense to the state in
passing and publishing such laws and the combinations by which
private speculations have been secured, and monopolies with
extraordinary and da.ngerous powers have been created, are well
known. 77e have prohibited the General Assembly hereafter from

passing such laws; and have required general laws in all cases
where a generable law can be made applicable. We have forbidden
the General Assembly from releasing any liability to the state
or to any municipal corporation therein, ^e have placed addit-
ional guards against speculative contracts made with officers
of the state for stationery, fuel, etc., and we have limited the
amount of expenditures to be incurred on account of the State
Capitol, now in process of construction."
"In addition to the usual guarantees of natural and civil
liberty, we have declared that no .person shall be denied any
civil or political right or capacity on account of his relig-
ious opinions. All persons have the right to publish the truth
with good motives and for justifiable ends. Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation to be ascertained by a jury. The fee of lands taken
for railroad tracks is to remain in the owners, subject $o the
use for whichjit is taken . All irrevocable grants of special
privileges or immunities are prohibited, to protect the people
against privileged orders and dangerous monopolies."
Additional limitations not found in the constitution of
1848 are found in a strengthened veto power by the governor,
a two thirds vote being required to overcome his official dis-
approval} in declaring void acts giving aid or support to
church or sectarian institutions^, in the enumeration of prop-
erty properly exempt from taxation and requiring such e.emptinn
to be by general law, in various restrictions upon the use of
the taxing power, ^ in more stringent control over the creation
of corporations ; ^ in fixing the limits of general banking laws^
1. Const. 111. 1870, Art.V sec. 16. 2. Ibid Art VIII sec.?. 3. Ibid
Art.IXsec3. 4. Ibid Art.JX secsl-13, 5 . Ibid . ArtXI sec , 1-4 . 6Ibid
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in forbidding any change in the obligation of the Illinois
Central to pay certain moneys into the treasury and in for-
bidding future authorizations of subscriptions by local bodies
in aid of railroads or private corporations.^
The increase of specific limitations upon legislation in
the constitution of 1870 over that of 1848 while noticeable in
amount is even more important when examined as to the nature of
the new provisions. i?ew technical requirements for valid pass-
age, requiring the printing of a bill and its amendments before
final vote, the requirement that all acts ,( instead of special
acts only as provided for in the constitution of 1848) have but
one subject and that properly expressed in the title, the act
being void to so much as is not so expressed, and the require-
ment that amended or revived acts be printed at length in the
body of the amending or reviving act, furnish a much more com-
plete control over legislation through technical requirements
than was found under the previous constitutions. Much more
important is the restriction placed upon special legislation.
By the prohibition of the many enumerated classes of special
acts (some 23 in number) a much mor^ complete control over
special legislation than under the constitution of 1848 whicv
had fewer restrictions of like character. The completeness of
this control is further aided in two directions by constitut-
ional requirements, (a) that revenue laws shall be uniform in
their operation and, (b) that laws relating to the practice and
procedure of courts must be uniform in scope and authority. The
more significant new limitations imposed upon legislation by
the constitution of 1870, are, an increase in the number of clas
1. Const. 111. 1870, separate section. 2. Ibid, separate sec-
tion.
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-ses of special legislation specifically prohibited, and, ne ,rr
technical requirements for legal enactment of measures which
extend to every act of the general assembly. As in the preced-
ing constitutional period, the enforcement of these limitations
devolved upon the courts and as the final authority upon issue-
is of validity rested with the sunreme court, that body found
its power extended as against the period 1848-70 in much the
same fashion as did the court under the constitution of 1848 as
against the period 1818-48.^*
As under the constitution of 1848 with its limitations on
legislative action the number of contests involving the valid-
ity of laws rapidly increased, so the increased limitations of
the constitution of 1870 were followed by a similar growth. The
increased population and wealth of the state gave rise to a
much greater mass of litigation, which has in turn involved the
invoking of constitutional restrictions upon legislation more
often than before. 'Thile from 1818 to 1848 the issue of the
validity of laws had been raised in but 29 cases and from 1648
to 1870 in 111, from the adoption of the constitution in 1870
to the end of the June term of court in 1913 the validity of
laws was passed upon by the supreme court in 789 cases, more
arising in the decade 1870-9 than in all the years previous.
Thus of the 929 cases in which the supreme court passed upon
the constitutionality of laws from 1818 to the end of the June
1. The constitutional requirement contained in Art. 4 Sec 22
that when a general law can be made applicable no special law
shall be enacted was held by the supreme court in Owners of
Land v. People, 113 111. 296 to be purely a matter of discret
ion for the legislature and a decision upon that point by the
general assembly not subject to judicial review. This seems
to be the settled interpretation given by the weight of auth-
ority to constitutional provisions of this character. The
debates of the constitutional convention of 1870 are silent as
to the purpose of this clause and by whom it is to be enforced.
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term in 1913 approximately 85 per cent were decided under the
present constitution.
A survey of the cases decided, by decades, shows a strong tend-
ency toward increasing use of the right tojchall enge the valid-
ity of laws in the courts. From 1870 to 1879 theissue arose in
149 cases, this lagge number being due to conflicts arising
from the adoption of the new constitution, from 1880 to 1889
the issue was decided in 145 cases, from 1890 to 1899 in 122
cases, from 1900 to 1909 in 228 cases, and since 1910 in 145
cases. Since 1900 therefoe the issue of the unconstitutional-
ity of laws has be^n raised in 373 cases more than in any 20
years previous to that date and this number is approximately
47 per cent of the total number of cases decided since 1870.
Comparison of the number of cases in which acts were upheld
and those in which acts were declared void show^ that the for-
mer class is more than twice as great as the latter. The pro-
portion between the cases sustaining and those denying the
validity of laws presents some variability. Thile for the en-
tire period, 1870-1913 the acts concerned were declared v.iic in
257 cases they were upheld in 532 instances, "or the period
1870-9 the cases were void, 67, upheld, 82; from 1880-9, void,
29, upheld, 116; from 1890-9, void 33, upheld, 89; from 1900 to
1909, void 92, upheld, 136; since 1910, void 36, upheld, 109.
It will be noticed that here as was seen in a survey of the
total number of cases that the proportion of void cases to
valid is highest for the period 1900-9 and from 1900 to date
exceeds the proportions for the period 1880-99.
*
The significance of the power of the courts to pass upon the
1. These comparisons are for the numbers of decisions only, and
not for the number of laws passed on, as the latter could be
flet-gXiaiJied only wit-: great difficulty.
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constitutionality of laws is found not so much in the total
number of laws held void as in the importance of the acts de-
clared invalid. Thus for the period 1870-9 while acts were
held void in 67 cases, most of these were merely local or spec-
ial acts and but two of these, one relating to discrimination
in railroad rates and the other to prevent the irnportati n of
m exas and Cherokee cattle were of more than ordinary importance
Among the 29 cases in which acts were declared void from 1880-
to 1889 several were of considerable interest to the people of
the state. In Fillet v. People an act to protect the interests
of coal miners by requiring owners and operators of nines to
weigh all coal mined and payjon the basis of the weight of the
coal mined by each miner was declared void, thus affecting one
of the state's greatest industries. Other important laws held
invalid during this period were, two laws conferring general
banking powers and one relating to the commitment of dependent
girls. Of the 33 cases in ""hich acts were held void from 1890-
to 1899 at least nine concerned legislation of importance. In
Frorer v. People, an act seeking to destroy the practice of
maintaining company stores in the -Dining and manufacturing bus-
inesses was held void as was a later act seeking to require
certain enumerated classes of corporations to pay wages weekly.
These acts undoubtedly affected most of the greater industries
of the state. In Ritchie v. People an eight hour law for all
females in workshops and factories was declared unconstitution-
al; a decision -"'hich had a far reaching effect upon legislat-
ion for working classes in Illinois. T - .'o acts designed to sec-
ure the payment of wages of miners on the basis of the amount
of coal mined were declared void in this period as also an act
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prohibiting barbers from laboring on Sunday, one relating to
the admission of attorneys to practice and one seeking to pro-
tect the use of trademarks. Of the 92 cases from 1900 to 1909
in which acts were declared void at least 23 concerned laws of
unusual importance. r t will be of interest to note some of these
In Massie v. Cessna, the loan shark act which would have affect
-ed the interests of all low salaried and wage earning persons
was declared invalid. Three primary laws were held void and at
various times portions of the municipal court act, one of great
importance to the residents of Chicago. In Oillespie v. People
a lav/ designed to prevent discrimination by employers against
union workmen was declared unconstitutional. In Starne v. Peo-
ple an act requiring mine operators to furnish wash rooms for
miners was declared void. Since 1910 among the 36 cases in
which the court has refused to uphold laws may be found a num-
ber of great importance
.
o the interests of laborers and other
economic classes. In Josma v. Western Foundry and Steel Company
the court declared invalid an act which sought to protect work-
men against being enticed to places to "ork under false repre-
sentations. In a later case an act forbidding the use of emery
"/heels and belts in basements was declared invalid. Among the
number may also be listed a primary law, portions of the muni-
cipal court act, the important county civil service act, a law
relating to .mechanic ' s liens and others of interest either to
the entire body of citizens of the state or to large economic
groups. It will thus be seen that the number of important laws
held void has been rapidly increasing and it is in these rather
than in the total number of laws held void that the greatest
objection to the practice of judicial control is found. In fai-
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rness to the court it must be said that the pressure upon it
to declare laws void is great. Thus since 1907 there have been
twenty one cases in which the validity of the municipal court
act has been attacked to say nothing of the numerous occasions
on which the court has refused to hear arguments directed ag-
ainst the validity of the law. The result of such repeated
efforts is very likely, in the case of acts which are long
and complicated in character t to be a decision that the act in
question is void at least in part if not wholly. It would be
almost impossible to evade in all particulars invalidity in
the drafting of such a voluminous law.
An analysis of the grounds upon which laws have been decla-
red void or upheld since 1870 shows some interesting developm-
ents. Of the 7 :9 cases, 67 relate to municipal ordinances, 1
to a. federal law and one to an Indiana statute. The main ground
of decision in 73 cases was the requirement that the subject be
properly expressed in the title, in 93 taxation and revenue
provisions, in 87 special legislation, in 6^ acts relating to
f.he judiciary article, in 115 due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, in 42 provisions relative to local gov-
ernment, in 28 the separation of powers, in 25 technical req-
uirements of passage, in 36 general legislative power, in 27
contract rights, in 16 the right of jury trial, in 23 other
provisions of the bill of rights and the remaining 45 concer-
ned various grounds. In addition 24 cases '-ere decided on fed-
oral grounds and eleven were concerned with corporation rights.
Although the issue of whether the subject was correctly express
- ed in the title was resorted to in 73 cases in but 16 were
acts declared void for that reason, and the erapolyment of this
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provision does not seem to be on the increase. Of the 93 case-
si on taxation grounds 32 contained declarations of invalidity,
and the number of cases each decade remains much the same. The
employment of technical grounds is on the increase as twice as
many cases involving them are found since 1900 than before that
date. The significant increases are found in the use of special
legislation and due process of law grounds of contest. Of 81
contests on the ground of special legislation 46 occur since
1900 and in 26 of these acts were declare 3 void. The due pro-
cess of law cases run by decades as follows: 1870-
.
,6, 188 -9
9, 1390-9, 26, 1900-09, 45, and since 1910, 29. Thus of the
115 cases 74 occur since 1900. ^hese figures however, must be
qualified by the statement that often more than one ground for
invalidity is advanced in a case and though not appearing in
the summary, may contribute toward invalidity in cases where
acts are declared void.
Enough has been advanced to show that the practice of pass-
im:; upon the constitutionality of laws is on the increase, and
that the increase since 1900 has been much faster than that
before that time. There is at present little prospect of abate-
ment. It appears also that the supreme court has refused to con-
trol legislation outside the regular channels of litigation but
that within that limit the constitution has afforded ample opp-
ortunity for such control. The fact that the number of cases
in which laws were upheld far exceeds those in which laws were
held void might seem to indicate that judicial control means
little but approval of the legislative will, however, the in-
crease in the number of important laws held void augmenting
in each decade shows that this power has a wide and far reach-

ing influence. Therein lies the chief objection to the use of
judicial control of legislation. Ahd although important increas
-es are noted in the employment of special legislation and tech
-nical requirement;- of pas -age for the attacking of laws, by
far the greatest and ;iiost important increns e lies in the field
of the due process of law c lause of the bill of rights. And
through the doctrine of due process of law developed by the
court the most damaging effect upon legislation has been accom-
plished .

The Illinois Doctrine of Due Process of Law as a Restriction
TTpon Legislation
The due process of law clause found in the constitutions
of 1818 and 18481 was virtually a copy of the similar provision
of chapter 39 of the Great Charter of King John of 1215 as amen-
ded and affirmed by Chapter 35 of the Great Charter of Henry III,
two years later, 2 but with the addition of the phrase, "or de-
prived of his life, liberty, or property." The clause provided:
"That no freeman shall be imprisoned or disseized of his free-
hold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in
any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land," and was
therefore similar in scope to the second article of compact
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which declared that no man
should be deprived of liberty or property but by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land.
By the time that the constitutional convention of 1869
had met, the number of states using the original form, "by the
judgment of his peers," in the due process of law provisions in
their constitutions had decreased and some had adopted the now
familiar "due process of law" guarantee. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal constitution, also containing this
latter provision, had been adopted just a year previous. And
when the constitution of 1870 was submitted for ratification,
the bill of rights was found to contain a due process of law
clause similar in form to that of Amendments V and XIV of the
Consti tution of the United States. 3
1) Const . 111. 1818 sec. 8 artTT
Const. 111. 1848 sec. 3 art. 8.
2) Stubb' Select Charters, pp. 301, 346.
3) Const. 111. 1870, sec. 3, art. 2.
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Under the constitution of 1818 the due process guarantee
was invoked but once in opposition to a law of the state. In
Rhinehart v. Schuyler1 it was urged by the plaintiff that the
portion of the revenue law of 1828 which provided for the sale
of lands for delinquent taxes by a summary proceeding, deprived
ovmers of their property, contrary to the law of the land and
without the judgment of their peers. In upholding the act, the
court discussed at 3orae length the meaning of the due process of
law clause. Quoting Lord Coke the court decided that "by the
law of the land" was meant by indictment or presentment of good
and lawful men, that therefore this provision applied to criminal
proceedings only and that a sale of land for taxes without jury
trial, in a summary proceeding, did not deprive the owner of his
land without "due process of law" even though the amount in
controversy was insignificant as compared with the value of the
land. As if uncertain of its ground the court qualified its
position by saying that if the provision was intended to apply
to civil proceedings, it was only in a limited and restricted
sense. The fact that 19 out of 20 other states had upheld
similar laws as not violating due process of law was quoted as
supporting the position of the court. A curiously mistaken
idea that the Fifth Amendment to the constitution of the United
States was binding upon the states as to the taking of life,
liberty, or porperty without due process of law wa3 advanced in
connection with this argument. Though not specifically men-
tioned in the courts' opinion the use of the "due process of law"
clause as a check upon legislation is assumed, within the limited
application accorded its operation In this case.
_
I) "2"Giljn."~473 (1845).
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The limited view of this guarantee of the bill of rights
did not long remain the rule of the court for the nine oases in
which the due process of law limitation was invoked during the
period 1848-1870 show a broader interpretation. That the court
had extended the due process of law clause to include restriction
upon civil proceedings affecting personal and property rights
clearly appears from the cases in this period. In the case of
Johnson v. Stark County, ^ in which the court upheld a statute
giving authority to counties and cities to issue bonds in aid of
railroads as not violating due process of law it was held that
this limitation was intended to secure the citizen against all
arbitrary power exercised by the government. The occupying
claimants law, which gave the adverse possessor of land, held
for seven years, without challenge, complete title to such land,
was held in Ross v. ?ryor,3 and Stearns v. Gi£tings,3 not to
deprive owners of their property without due process of law. So
too, in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Company, 4 an
act relating to condemnation proceedings for the taking of land
for railroad U3e wa3 held not to violate due process of law for
failure to provide a method for giving notice of such proceedings
Beginning with the case of Russell v. Rumsey^ decided in 1864
several cases show a disposition on the part of the court to
consider the due process of law limitation as applying to the
1 34 111. 75" (I860") .
2, 1 14 111. 171 (1853).
3; 1 33 111. 332 (I860).
4
5; l 35 111. 363 (1864)
.
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just referred to, a portion of an act of 1853 amendatory to the
conveyance law "by which it was provided that dower rights might
"be relinquished through a certificate of acknowledgement and
this provision extended to acts prior to the adoption of the law,
was held void as an attempt to divest the vested right of dower.
So, too, in Rose v. Sanderson ,^it was held that the married
woman's separate property act of 1861 did not exempt a husbands
estate "by curtesy from^Levy under execution for debt as such
estate was a vested interest which could not be altered by the
legislature. In Hunter v. Hatoh,2 decided in 1867, an act of
1867 declaring that the excess of interest over the legal rate
should be forfeited but also providing that sums in excess of
ten per cent voluntarily paid by the debtor should not be de-
ducted from the principal was declared void as a taking of a
vested right. Said the court: "Under the law as it existed
prior to the passage of this act, all payments of usury were
treated as payments on the principal still remaining unpaid,
when insisted upon by the debtor. The law so appropriated it,
and it was a vested right of the debtor to have it thus applied.
It is beyond the legislative power to abrogate a vested right
or to transfer it to another person." In the later case of
Parmalee v. Lawrence ,3 an act directing thatjin cases involving
the question of usurious interest arising while the law of 1848
was in force and before the law of 1857 was passed, the penalty
for usury should be forfeiture of the excess of interest money
above the legal rate was upheld as not divesting moneylenders of__
IT 38 111. 347 (1868).
3) 45 111. 178 (1867).
3) 48111. 331 (1868).
*
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a vested right in the previously applied penalty for usury, since
the law recognized no vested right in penalties. These cases
show that the court had reached the position of including vested
property rights within the constitutional guarantee and mark the
most pronounced development of due process of law control over
legislation for the period 1848-70. Throughout this period
little discussion of the limitation of thedue process of law
clause appears in any of the court's opinions but its decisions
show that this check upon legislation was applied to cases
involving civil as well as criminal proceedings and that by it
a beginning was made toward the control of the substanoe as well
as the procedure of the laws.
It has remained for the present constitutional period to
develop the court's definition of the nature of the due process
of law limitation. It is found in tracing out the definition
given to due process of law that what is due process is a varying
matter accordingly as it is the substance or procedure of the
act that is being considered. And, too, when acts whose pro-
cedure is assailed as taking life, liberty, or property without
due process of law are passed upon there is a very real differ-
ence in the meaning of the limitation as between administrative
and judicial procedure.
In 1873 the court is found making an expression as to the
scope of due process of law in applying to acts involving judicial
procedure. In Campbell v. Campbell, ^ in holding void a section
of the chancery statute which permitted judgment in certain cases
without notice to infant defendants, the court said that due
_
1) 63 111. 4-62 11Q72).'
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process of law had "reference to judicial proceedings according
to the course and ways of the common law." No departure has
been made from this definition though it has received amplifica-
tion and explanation in later cases. In People ex rel Hanberg
v. Cohen,! in upholding a section of the local improvement act
which provided for a summary trial of assessment cases by the
county court without appeal, (following several previous deci-
sions that the right' of appeal wa3 a statutory and not a common
law right and therefore might be denied in the discretion of the
legislature), the court said thus: "An orderly proceeding where
a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has
an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights
before a court having power to hear and judicially determine
such case is due process of law." If, however, the legisla-
ture grants the right of appeal, such right must be equal as to
both parties to a suit. In Green v. Red Cross Medical Service
Company^ in holding invalid a section of the practice act of 1907
which authorized the supreme court to review findings of fact
made by the appellate courts, the court said: "The legislature
may give remedies where none existed before or may change the
nature of the remedies, but the privilege granted to one must be
extended to all. That the legislature may make the right of
appeal depend either upon the amount in controversy, the amount
of the judgment, or the amount claimed in the pleadings, or may
fix different conditions for the different parties by giving to
one party a limited right of appeal on questions of law and
providing that he. jQiali.J1°A **aigtt any error calling in ques tion
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the determination of the appellate court upon the controverted
question of fact, and giving to the other party a right to have
the judgment reviewed on all questions, both of law and fact. To
do that is to confer a special privilege on one party to the
suit, to deprive the other party of the equal protection of the
laws and infringe upon the guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
aw, which means the law of the land or laws operating uniformly
under general rules applicable to all parties." The require-
ment of due process of law in relation to judicial procedure
thus demands judicial proceedings before a court having competent
jurisdiction, with notice to the parties and opportunity for
hearing. The matter of appeal is in the hands of the legisla-
ture but if exercised must not operate unequally.
With regard to what is due process of law in administra-
tive procedure the requirement is somewhat different. More
uncertainty is shown here than in the case of laws relating to
judicial procedure. In Commissioners of Union Drainage Dis-
trict No. 1 v. Smith, 1 decided in 1908 the court held void a
portion of the drainage law which enabled drainage commissioners
to assess lands for benefits when authorized by juries in
assessment case3, in|3o\far as it permitted commissioners inter-
ested in any property assessed, to levy assessments. Taking the
ground that proceedings established by statute are not necessarily
due process of law the court said: "The term 'due process of
law' has been often defined. It is doubtful whether any defini-
tion affords a test which will enable the courjts to determine
1) 333 111. 417 (1908).
~~
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in every instance, whether or not any particular statute is in
violation of this provision of the constitution." That the
application of the due process of law limitation will be re-
stricted to the maintenance of recognized rights only, appears
from the case of People ex rel Joyce v. Strasshefim . ^ In
this case the court upheld the parole act as not depriving a
paroled prisoner of liberty without due process of law in
giving the warden of the state penitentiary power to retake and
re-imprison paroled prisoners without trial or hearing, since
such prisoner was not entitled to have his right to parole de-
termined in this manner. In this connection the court said:
"Due process of law or the law of the land does not mean sta-
tutes passed by the legislature, but it means certain funda-
mental rights which our system of jurisprudence has always re-
cognized, and extends to every governmental proceeding which may
interfere with personal or property right, whether the process
be legislative, judicial, administrative or executive." In
other cases involving acts whose administrative procedure gives
discretionary power to administrative officers, the limitation
of that discretion appears'. In Noel v. People, 2 in holding
void a section of the pharmacy act of 1895 which gave to the
board of pharmacy the power to issue permits to sell patented
remedies "in their discretions 11 the court declared that: "A
law which thus invests any board, or body of officers, with a
discretion, which is purely arbitrary, and whioh may be exer-
cised in the interest of a favored few, is invalid. I t makes
TTti'2 I11.3WT1W9T."
"
3) 187 111.387 (1900).
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an unjust discrimination between persons coming within the
same class." In the more recent case of People v. Apfelbaum^-
the court upheld a section of the medical practice act which
gave the State Board of Health the power to revoke or refuse
licenses to practice medicine, for certain specified causes.
Here the court said: "Due process of law does not necessarily
imply judicial proceeding. Orderly proceedings according to
established rules which do not violate fundamental right must
be observed, but there is no vested right in any particular
remedy or form of proceeding. A general law, administered,
in its regular course, according to the form or procedure suit-
able and proper to the nature of the case, conformable to the
fundamental rules of right and affecting all persons alike, is
due process." Thus it appears that due process of law in
administrative proceedings demands an orderly proceeding,
general in its application, with suitable and proper forms of
procedure, and a proper regard for fundamental personal and
property rights. In the case of acts vesting discretionary
authority in administrative officers, such discretion must be
so limited that favoritism will be unlikely. An act of the
legislature does not necessarily create such procedure as will
be due process of law and it may be difficult to apply the test
of any definition in this regard; evidently statutes establishing
administrative procedure are scrutinized more as to whether or
not broad individual rights are invaded thereby, than as to the
forms which may have been previously in use.
When we examine the court's definition of due process
1) 351 111" 18 (1911).
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of law as limiting the substance of acts we find a much more
extensive expression. of opinion on the part of the court. In
Millet v. People, 1 an early case in which an act requiring
operators ofcoal mines to weigh all coal mined and pay miners
upon the basis of the weight mined by each man was held void
as violating due process of law, it was declared that due pro-
cess of law means "general public law, binding upon all the
members of the community, under all circumstances, and not
partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private indi-
viduals or classes of individuals." And it was decided in this
case that singling out the operators of coal mines for a regu-
lation which restricted them in making contracts for labor,
deprived them of the equal protection of the laws as compared
with those in other businesses and limited their right of con-
tract, which was a property right, thus depriving such persons
of property without due process of law. In the later case of
A/
Fxoer v. People,*3 in which an act forbidding mine owners and
manufacturers to operate company stores, was declared uncon-
stitutional in part, the protection of contract rights through
due process of law was affirmed. Said the court: "The privi-
lege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right and
if A is denied the right to contract and acquire property in a
manner which he has hitherto enjoyed under the law, and which B,
C and D are still allowed by the law to enjoy, it is clear that
he is deprived of both liberty and property to the extent that
he is thus denied the right to contract
.J'_ These cases establish
1) 117 111. 294
2) 141 111. 171
(1886)
(1892)
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the principle that if the 9ubstance of an act is such that
thereby certain persons or classes are arbitrarily singled out
and burdens imposed on them not imposed on others in like con-
ditions, the persons or classes thus singled out are deprived
of the equal protection of the laws and are restricted in their
contract rights, thus being denied liberty and property without
due process of law.
In Bracevilie Coal Co. v. People, 1 a case in which a
statute requiring weekly payment of wages by certain classes of
corporations was held void partly upon the ground that it was a
taking of property without due process of law, the doctrine
announced in Millet v. People and Frorer v. People received a
fuller expression. In reference to the right of the legisla-
ture to single out particular classes for legislation the court
said: "laws depriving particular persons or classes of persons
of rights enjoyed by the community at large, to be valid, must
be based on some existing distinction, or reason not applicable
to others included within its provisions." The rights protected
under this definition were stated broadly. Thus liberty "means
not only freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint,
but is deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free in
the use of his powers and faculties, and to adopt and pursue
auch avocation or calling, as he may choose, subject only to the
restraints necessary to secure the common welfare . "Property" , in
its broader sense, is not the physical thing which may be the
subject of ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession,
and power of di spos i tion which may be acquired over it; and the
1) 147 111. 66 ."193 7
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right of property, preserved by the constitution, in the right
not only to possess and enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any
lawful mode, or by following any lawful industrial pursuit which
the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guaranteed may
choose to adopt." In Ritchie v. People, 1 the right of the
legislature to limit contract rights was admitted by the court
as a restriction upon the due process of law doctrine, though
with limitation. Thus the court said: "the right to contract
may be subject to limitations growing out of the duties which
the individual owes to society, to the public or to the govern-
ment. These limitations are sometimes imposed by the obligation
to so use one's property as not to injure another, by the charac-
ter of property as affected with a public interest, or devoted
to a public use, by the demands of public policy or the necess-
ity of protecting the public from fraud or injury, by the want
of capacity, by the needs of the necessitous borrower as against
the demands of the extortionate lender. But the power of the
legislature to thus limit the right to contract must rest upon
some reasonable basis and cannot be arbitrarily exercised. It
has been said, that such power is based in everyfcase on some
condition, and not on the absolute right to contract. Where
legislative enactments which operate upon classes of individuals
only, have been held to be valid, it has been where the classi-
fication was reasonable and not arbitrary."
Since this case (1895) the emphasis of the court in
defining due process of law is placed less upon the maintenance
of contract rights a s such, and mor e upon the illegal character
1) 155 111. 98 (1895).
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of arbitary discriminations. In Bailey v. People, 1 a case
decided in 1901, the court held void an act giving the State
Board of Health authority to supervise lodging houses. In
holding the act to be a discrimination in favor of hotels and
boarding houses the court said: "An act which arbitrarily dis-
criminates against one class in the transaction of a business
or a lawful occupation, and leaves unaffected by such discrim-
inating enactment other persons or classes of persons engaged
in acquiring property in a manner not distinguishable in char-
acter from that in which the class discriminated against is
employed is in contravention of the constitutional guarantee
"of due process of law." Since this case the definitions given
by the court have been substantially the 3ame as that in the
Ritchie case and we may consider that the court has a fairly
fixed definition for due process of law as applied to the sub-
stance of acts. The essential feature of this definition aside
from the maintenance of contract rights except under certain
enumerated cases is that the court will not uphold acts which
are directed at actions involving particular classes unless
the classification made by the legislature is deemed by the
court to be reasonable. In order to fulfill the requirements
of reasonableness the classification must embrace, according
to the language of the court, substantially all the persons
or classes who might be affected by the provisions and not
exclude from its operation any persons or classes similarly
situated
.
_
IT 190 111. 28.
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It will be seen from these quotations taken from repre-
sentative cases involving the due process of law issue before
the Illinois Supreme Court that in the case of acts involving
either judicial or administrative procedure greater exactness
of standards is evidenced in the definitions given which make
certain what will and what will not be held to violate due
process of law than in the case of acts whose substance is
questions. Thus as to acts involving judicial procedure it is
evident that so long as acts do not violate the right of pro-
cedure developed under the common law nor created inequality
in providing for court appeals there will be no doubt of their
validity. So, too, though it does not appear quite so clearly,
in acts involving administrative procedure invalidity follows
only disregard for the rules and forms established for the
protection of private rights or violation of personal rights.
The scope of these limitations is well known and the forms of
procedure which are permissible under the due process of law
guarantee have been developing since the Great Charter of 1215.
In the case of statutes whose substance i3 claimed to
violate due process of law, the situation is different. For
these acts there is often no precedent and they are intended
in the main to meet new situations born of the growth of the
state and the increasing complexity of its social and industrial
life. To remedy many of the evils occasioned in business
and industry acts must be directed to a portion or class only
instead of the entire population of the state. Unfortunately,
there are no hard and fast lines which may serve as a basis for
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legislative classification in dealing with social and indus-
trial problems. Whenever the lines of classification is drawn,
there must be some distinction, to a certain extent arbitrary,
between those included within the classification and those ex-
cluded. Thi3 is characteristic of all classification in this
field, and whether a particular classification is regarded as
proper or improper by the court, under its rules of classifica-
tion, depends upon the strictness or liberality of the court
in each particular case. When therefore it is sought to apply
the doctrine evolved by the court that the legislature may not
single out persons or classes and impose upon them burdens not
imposed upon other persons or classes in substantially the same
situation, the status of what is due process of law is likely
to be fluctuating. As each classification made by the legis-
lature in passing laws for the amelioration of social and econ-
omic conditions is presumably based upon a knowledge of the needs
of the specific situation involved, each such law is likely to
present a new application of the due process of law rule. As
the determination of whether or not a legislative classification
is arbitrary is purely a question of fact; it follows that in
passing upon such matters the Supreme Court exercises a very real
control over legislation. Few decisions will be found to be
similar if for no other reason than that in few laws will the
same classification be adopted. Thus circumstances render
impossible as regard the substance of law the degree of cer-
tainty of meaning attended by due proce33 of law as related
to procedure.
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While the greater number of the cases in which the due pro-
cess of law limitation has been invoked involve attacks upon the
procedure of acts, these cases have relatively little influence
in the adding to the extended control over legislation which has
been brought about by this guarantee. The reason i3, largely,
that if the substance of an act by valid but the procedure void,
it will be possible at the succeeding session of the legislature
to amend the procedure and thus render the law valid. Hence in
most cases of this character the effect upon legislation is but
temporary. The findings in these cases are of chief importance
in defining due proce33 of law as regards procedure and a summary
would be but a digest, valuable only as an enumeration of what
proceedings are and are not due process of law.
When we turn to the consideration of acts whose substance
is assailed as taking liberty or property without due process of
law a much more serious situation is found. It will, perhaps,
appear more clearly from a survey of the development of the due
process of law limitation in Illinois. While in but one case
was this limitation invoked against a law from 1818 to 1848 and
in but nine from 1848 to 1870, under the present constitution there
have been 115 such cases. The development in number since 1870
has proceeded increasingly despite the fluctuation of the total
number of cases in which the validity of laws was challenged. Thus
while from 1870 to 1879 the total number of cases was 149; from
1880 to 1889, 145; from 1890 to 1899, 133; from 1900 to 19o9, 338
and since 1910, 145, the number of due process of law cases has
been, 1370 to 1879, 6; 1880 to 1889, 9; 1390 to 1899, 36; 1900 to
1909, 45, since 1910, 39. Thus while the total number of cases
^Z^.go§^JLJ^^g^Z_j^°j^^... u**£fe=19Q0*~rd^ yi^U n-ro-f / *> - ?
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the number of due process of law caaes actually increased. The
cassa in which acta have been declared void aa violating due pro-
Iceaa of law because of their aubatance bear an importance to social
and economic legislation out of proportion to their total in the
due process of law group. For example, in the one field of laws
for the protection of laborers from 1885 to 1889 one law of im-
portance waa declared void, from 1890 to 1899 8ix, from 1900 to
1909, eight, and aince 1910, two. The reasons for the growing
use of the due process of law limitation and its application to
legislation of a social character lie in the growth of business
and industry and in the extended definition of due process of law.
The change from an agricultural to a manufacturing and mining state
as well, bringing with it problems of the relation of employer and
employes, regulation of the conditions of industry and the need
for protecting the weaker economic classes, made necessary a great
amount of legislation of new and untried character. The court in
endeavoring to protect the rights of parties in suits when the
validity of such laws were involved sought through the interpreta-
tion of the guarantees in the bill of rights to establish a basis
upon which to fix individual rights under these laws. "With a
widened application of the due process of law provision, created
partly through necessity, partly in following previous rulings in
other states on similar matters is was not long until this limita-
tion v/as invoked by litigants against a,ny legislation of social
aims. The result of this situation, while on the whole giving
the court a control over a large and increasingly important
of legislation, has been unfortunate. The court refuses to per-
mit social and economical legislation based on classifications
deemed by it to
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violate due process of law, to stand, and the legislature is be-
wildered because of inability to know what classifications will
stand the test of the court's doctrine of due process of law.
Under the Illinois doctrine that legislation aimed at the benefit
of classes or portions of the people niu3t have a reasonable basis
and not be in any way arbitrary, the standards of the court in
deciding questions of classification become of vital importance.
Ha3 the court created a doctrine of classification which is certain
and unchanging or is its doctrine rather, in the language of Justice
Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, "pricked ^by the gradual
approach and contact of decision on the opposing sides?" 1 A
survey of the classifications upheld and denied as subjects of
legislation should at least reveal the main outlines of a doctrine,
if one by discoverable at all.
In 18$6 the classification principle was first invoked in
Millet v. People 2 in which case in holding void an act which re-
quired mine owners and operators to furnish scales at the mines,
weigh all coal mined and pay miners on the basis of the amount
mined, the court declared that mine owners and operators could not
be singled out as a class for the imposition of burdens not im-
posed on the other employers of labor. In 18S2, in Frorer v.
People, 3 in declaring unconstitutional a portion of an act forbid-
ding owners, operators of mines and factories to maintain company
stores, it was held that these industries could not be singled out
leaving employers in other businesses free and it was stated by the
court that the legislature could legislate only for the mining and
_____ _
(manufactur-
1) Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 319 U.S. 104 at p. 113. .
3) 117 111, 394.
3) 141 111. 131.
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ing industries where they differed from all other industrial bran-
ches. In the same year an act requiring the owners and operators
of coal mines, where the miner was paid on the basis of the amount
of coal mined and delivered by him, to weigh all coal and pay on
the basis of such weights was held void as in the previous case of
Millet v. People. ^ In 1893 in Braceville Coal Company v. People2
an act requiring certain enumerated classes of corporations to pay
wages weekly was declared void because, distinguishing between cor-
porations and individuals who might employ labor and because not
including certain other corporations.
In 1895 in Ritchie v. People^ an act providing for an eight
hour day of labor for all females in workshops and factories was
held void as discriminatory. As the title of this act purposed
"to regulate manufactures of clothing, wearing apparel and other
articles, etc.," it was decided by the court that if the eight hour
day was limited to these enumerated industries, it discriminated in
favor of other manufacturers, if applicable to all manufactories
it favored those in other industries. Also the classification
was held to be an attempt to discriminate between men and women on
the basis of sex and to discriminate in favor of salesmen, domestic
servants, stenographers, and other women on other lines of indus-
try in permitting them freedom of contract.
Down to 1896 therefore the court had refused to consider
employers and operators of coal mines as a sufficiently distinct
class to permit wage regulation in the mining industry, and held
that miners and manufacturers could not be classified for_legisla-
rj" Ramsey v7~ People" 142" 111 . 380".""*"
3) fe. 147 111. 66.
3) 300 111. 98.
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tion except where they differed entirely from other industries.
Nor would it permit the enumeration of classes of corporations or
allow a law regulating the hours of labor to be upheld for women
in factories and workshops, claiming such not a sufficiently dis-
tinct class. Sex also, did not constitute a sufficient difference
to justify legislation for women alone.
In 1896 the court held in Meadowcraft v. People^ that it was
proper to single out the business of banking for legislation, as it
was a business affected with a public interest. In Harding v.
People 2 it was held that a requirement that all mine owners and
operators whose product was shipped by rail or water, weigh all
coal mined and pay on the basis of weight, was an arbitrary classi-
fication discriminating in favor of the mine owner or operators
whose product was sold at the mine. In the same year, in Eden
v. People, 3 a law requiring barbershops to be closed on Sunday was
declared void as an arbitrary discrimination against barbering
business. In 1899 an ordinance of the city of Chicago, 4 making
it unlawful for persons selling dry goods, clothing, jewelry and
drugs from selling provisions and forbidding the sale of liquor
-/."here dry goods, clothing, jewelry or hardware was sold, was held
void as an unreasonable classification and in city of Monmouth v.
P3B»l5 ail ordinance of Monmouth permitting druggists to sell liquor
in quantities of less than one gallon was held void as a discrimina-
tion against other businesses. A law entitling holders of diplo-
mas from two year law schools to
1) 163 111. 56.
3) 160 111. 459.
3) 161 111. 296.
4) City of Chicago v. Mfcster, 183 111. 104.
5) 183 111. 634.
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be admitted to the bar on the presentation of the aame waa declared
to be an unwarranted discrimination against those not holding such
diplomas and held void partly for this reason. In 1899, also, in
Lusher v. People,! a classification of produce commission merchants
for the purpose of requiring a license from them was upheld as not
discriminating in favor of grain, livestock and dressed meat
dealers
.
During the period 1896-1899 it is apparent that bankers are
a sufficiently distinct class for legislation as are also produce
commission merchants. On the contrary, barbers may not be singled
out as a class, nor druggists, nor owners and operators of mines
whose product is shipped by rail or water. Nor may the merchant
dealing in certain articles be forbidden to sell others or the
hclder of a law diploma be given an opportunity denied others not
so fortunate.
In 1900 in Ruhstrat v. People*3 a law forbidding the use of
the flag in advertising was held to discriminate unjustly because
permitting those who gave public or private art exhibitions to use
the flag therein. In the same year, however, in Booth v. People^
the court upheld an act making criminal grain option contracts,
holding that, "It is sufficient if the selection of the articles
and property is based on reasonable and just grounds of difference
and the prohibition comprehends all kinds of property, within the
relations and circumstances which constitute the distinction," and
the remedy need only be as comprehensive as the evil the law de-
signed to remove." In the same year an ordinance4 of Chicago re-
quiring union labor only upon public works was held void as an un-
(just
IT 183 111. 236. 3) 186" 111. 42.
3) 185 111. 133. 4) 188 111. 206.
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discrimination and in Gillispie v. People, an act designed to
protect union working men from discharge or refusal to hire be-
cause of union membership was said to make an unwarrantable dis-
tinction between union and non-union workmen.
In 1901, a horseshoers' licensing act^ made applicable
only to cities of over 50,000 people but permitting those having
a population of from 10,000 to 50,000 to adopt its provisions
was held void as an arbitrary discrimination between those en-
gaged in the same occupation. In the same year in Bartey v.
People 2 an act forbidding more than six persons to 3leep in one
room in a lodging house was held void as a discrimination in
favor of hotels and boarding houses. In 1903, a Chicago
ordinance^ was declared void because singling out one switch
track and declaring it a nuisance, the court holding thi3 dis-
criminatory. In Mathews v. People, 4 a section of the free
employment agency act forbidding the use of the agencies to
employers whose workmen were on strike was declared to be an
arbitrary classification between employees, those affected by
a strike or lock-out and those who were not. In the same
year in People v. Butler Street Foundry and Iron Company, how-
ever, a classification of corporations, requiring them to file
anti-trust affidavits was upheld as not discriminating in favor
of individuals and partnership and an amendment exempting
building, loan and homestead associations was upheld. Another
provision however authorizing agreements, that in mining, manu-
facturing or the production of articles, where the chief cost
was wages, A to maintain
,
1) 188 Hi. 136. " 3f Bessette v. People", 193 111. 334.
3) 190 111. 28. 4) People v. Blacki, 203 111. 363.
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or increase wages was declared void.
Thus from 1901 to 1905, a classification of the horse-
shoers industry on the population basis was held void, also a
regulation affecting lodging houses but not hotels and boarding
houses and an ordinance declaring a single switch track a nuisance.
Striking laborers may not be protected by refusing employers
the use of free employment agencies and wage maintenance agreements
are void. Corporations are, however, deemed to be a valid class
for regulation and the exemption of building, loan and homestead
associations from that classification was upheld.
In 1906, in Starne v. People,! an act requiring mine
operators in mines where work is carried on at a greater depth
than 300 feet to furnish washrooms for miners was held void as an
arbitrary distinction between individuals in the same situation
and as discriminating in favor of miners and against workers in
steel mills, foundries, etc. In 1907 an act forbidding ticket
scalping in theatre tickets was held void as an arbitrary dis-
crimination against theatre managers and ticket brokers while
in the same year a plumber's licensing act applying to towns
of 5000 or over was upheld as a valid classification. 2 in 1908
an act authorizing lien holders to recover attorney's fees in
suit was held void as a discrimination against landlords, re-
gisters, carriers and other holders of special liens, 3 and in
Off v. Morehead, 4 the Bulk Sales act which was designed to protect
creditors as against fraudulent sales of stocks of merchandise
1}" 322 111. 189.'
""
2) 231 111. 340 People v. Steele.
3) Douglas v. People, 225 111. 536.
4) Manowsky v. Stephan, 333 111. 409.
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was declared void as not applying to business other than the
sale of merchandise. In the same year an ordinance of the city
of Chicago was upheld in requiring milk bottles or jars to be
stamped with the amount of the capacity as not discriminating
against dealers in other liquids in bottles and jars.l In 1909
in Massie v. Cessna, 2 an act regarding the assignment of wages
was declared void because applying to "wages, salary and income"
and in so doing restricting the method of assignment of those who
received larger salaries, thus discriminating against them, the
court intimating that such act should be limited to wages only.
In the same year in People v. Freeman, 3 a law forbidding the
coloring of oleomargarine was upheld as not discriminating in
favor of butter, and in city of Chicago v. Schmidinger
,
4 an ordi-
nance of Chicago fixing the size of loaves of bread was upheld
and declared not discriminating in singling out the baking busi-
ness for regulation.
From 1906 to 1909 therefore the court forbids a depth
limit in the application of a miner's washroom act, but upholds
a population classification for licensing plumbers. Ticket
scalping may not be forbidden because depriving theatre operators
arid ticket brokers of livelihood. Creditors of merchandise
dealers constitute a class too limited for legislation as also
that of general lien holders. Salaried classes are too com-
prehensive for legislation, but discriminating food and fraud
regulations are uphelcL__
_
,
.
,
1) City" of Chicago v. Bowman" Dairy Co. 234 111. 284.
3) 239 III. 353.
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In 1910, in Ritchie Co. v. Wayman, a womanHen hour
labor law was upheld because the basis of discrimination was
between shops where the pace for work was set by machinery and
those where not. Sex was also made a proper basis for classi-
fication for such a law. And in People v. Evans, 1 in the miner's
certification act, the exemption of miners from examination,
who had had two years experience and were at work when the act
went into effect was held not to discriminate against miners
not at work at the time. In 1911 an act to prevent unjust
discrimination between insurants of the same class or grade
was held not discriminating in exempting fraternal insurance
companies.^ However in Josma v. Western Steel Car and
Foundry Co. 3 an act to prevent imposition and fraud in bringing
workmen to a plant from a distance was declared void as. dis-
criminating between employers of workmen and other employers
in the measure of liability for fraud and between workmen living
near the plant and those away from it, and between workmen
and those in other lines of work. In 1912 in People v. Eler-
ding, 4 the court upheld the extension of the woman's ten hour
labor law to other industries including hotels and held that
the inclusion of hotels and exclusion of boarding houses was a
s
proper classification. In Tarantina v. L. & N. R. Co., an
act to prevent the use of liquor on trains was upheld in
excluding the operation of the act from dining, buffet and
sleeping cars. But in 1913 in People v. Schenck L an act for-
bidding the use of emery whe els or emery belts in basements,
_
_
1}~247 111. 547.
2) People v. Commercial Life Ins. Co. 247 111. 92.
3) People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. 252 111. 348. 249 111. 508.
4) 254 111. 529.
jr) ±rn iJUL- Q\ trim-***
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was declared void as an improper discrimination betv/een base-
ments and other rooms. In City of Clinton v. Wilson a Sunday
closing ordinance excluding persons observing some other day
as the Sabbath, cases of necessity or charity, and hotels, eating
houses, drug stores, tobacco stores, barber shops, and livery
stables was upheld as a proper classification.
A comparison of these classification decisions reveals
conflicting results. In the case of laws for the protection
of laborers the court in the early cases of Millet v. People,
Ramsey v. People and Harding v. People refused to uphold the
classification of the mining industry for the purpose of fixing
the conditions of payment of wages. In 1896 in Eden v. People,
a law singling out the barber's trade for regulation was declared
to be too narrow in its scope and ten years later, in Starne v.
People the court again refused to uphold legislation for the
benefit of miners though the act in this case was intended
largely as a health regulation. The recent case of People
v. Evans, however, takes quite the opposite view, that the
mining industry may be the subject of legislation alone, although
here, however, the legislation related to safety in mines, which
the constitution expressly recognizes as a proper subject for
legislation. In People v. Elerding in 1913 the court upheld
a not easily justifiable classification of industries under the
woman's ten hour labor law. The conflict between the attitude
in the earlier and the more recent cases is clear.
Equally conflicting are the classifications in the two
cases upon the subject of hours of labor for women. In the
earlier Ritchie case in 1895 the court refused to accept the
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distinction of sex as a proper ground for different legislation
for women upon the matter of hours of labor from that of men.
The court, also declared that the provision of the act in
applying to women in workshops and factories discriminated
improperly against saleswomen, stenographers and those in other
lines of work. In the second Ritchie case, in 1910, the
court declared that sex was a proper basis upon which to found
labor legislation for women and declared that the provisions
of the act in applying to women in factories, mechanical esta-
blishments and laundries, drew the proper line of discrimination
because the distinction made was between women who worked in
establishments where the pace was set by machinery and those in
working places when the pace was not so set. That the dis-
crimination declared invalid in 1895 would not be considered
a proper classification appears from the case of People v.
Elerding, in which the court upheld an extension of the operation
of the women ten hour law to certain industries and businesses
where the choice was not based upon the ground that in them the
pace for work was set by machinery.
In the matter of division within the bounds of an in-
dustry the conflict of decisions is even more puzzling. In
1901 in Bessette v. People the court held invalid a horse3hoer ! s
licensing act applying to cities over 50,000 population and by
local option to cities between 10,000 and 50,000 population
as an unwarranted discrimination between those in the same
industry but in 1903 in Douglas v. People the court upheld a
law applying the requirement that plumbers be licensed in
cities of 5,000 population and over. In Starne v. People
in 1906 the court refused to uphold a classification applying

to some miners but not to others "but in People v. Evans in 1911,
upheld a similar classification.
Difficulty is also found in harmonizing decisions upon
laws intended to protect wageworkers and salaried persons.
In Massie v. Cessna in 1909 the court held void a wage assign-
ment act applying to all wages, salary or income, holding that
an act should be limited to v/age earner only and ignoring com-
pletely the needs of persons living on small salaries. In
Josma v. Western Steel and Foundry Company in 1911 the court
held void another act, this time designed to protect workmen
against fraud and enticement in being secured to work, in part
because the provisions of the act did not extend to small
salaried and professional class'es.
Equally hard to reconcile are the decisions in the cases
of Braceville Coal Company v. People and People v. Butler Street
Foundry Company. In the former a classification of certain
enumerated corporations was declared unjustly discriminatory
because not including other corporations and because inposing
a burden on corporations not imposed on individuals and partner-
ships. In the latter case, a classification making a certain
requirement of all corporations but exempting certain enumerated
classes was upheld as proper and it was further declared not to
discriminate unfairly in not imposing the requirements upon
individuals and partnerships.
When other subjects are examined the difficulty is not
made less. In 1900 in Booth v. People the court upheld an
act directed against the making of grain option contracts, saying
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that this was a proper classification in not applying to other
contracts for future delivery as the terms of the act reached
the evil aimed at. In the same year the court held void (mainly
on other grounds) an act designed to prevent the use of the flag
for commercial purposes and refused to uphold an exemption which
permitted the use of the flag in art exhibitions, notwithstanding
the fact that the act amply reached the evil sought to be reme-
died. And while in Booth v. People the court through grain
option contracts a sufficiently broad subject for legislation
in 1908 in Off v. Morehead a law seeking to prevent fraudulent
sales of merchandise stocks was declared void as too narrow in
its classification. In Bailey v. People in 1901 the court
refused to uphold a law which sought to regulate the lodging
house business on the ground that such regulation discriminated
in favor of hotels and boarding houses. In People v. Elerding
the application of an act to hotels but excluding boarding houses
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company and People v. Schenck
illustrate well the uncertainty of the court's classification.
In the former case an act making punishable the drinking of
liquor on trains was upheld, the court holding that the exemption
of dining, buffet and sleeping cars was a proper one and the
classification valid. In the latter case, an act forbidding
the use of emery v/heels and belts in basements was declared void
as a discrimination against basements and rooms partly or wholly •
underground, and in favor of rooms above the ground. The
liberal view in the one case and the strict one in the other are
apparent
.
was held proper. Tarantina v.
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The rulings of other courts upon similar matters of
classification aid but little in determining classification
rules. This while the Supreme Court of the United States has
in McLean v. Arkansas, 1 upheld a coal weighing act and other
courts have done the same, many courts take the view of the
Illinois court that such legislation is improper. The deci-
sions in Frorer v. People and in Kellyville Coal Company v.
Harrier holding invalid the classification of the mining and
manufacturing business so far as forbidding the keeping of
company stores is concerned is opposed by the federal case of
Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Company, 2 but here as well other
courts may be found on either side of the view of the Illinois
court. The case of Eden v. People in which the Illinois court
held invalid a barbers Sunday closing law is another case well
in point, for while the United States Supreme Court sustained
a similar Minnesota act, 3 courts may be found both upholding or
denying the validity of such a law. The decision of the Illi-
nois court in Massie v. Cessna, holding void the wage assign-
ment act, is. opposite from that of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Mutual Loan Company v. Martell, 4 in which a
similar act of Massachusetts was upheld affirming the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court. The decision in the case of Off. v. More-
head, refusing to permit the regulation of sales is contrary to
that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lemieux v.
Young, g and
i; 311 U.S. 539 (1908).
3 183 U.S. 13 (1901).
3 Petit v. Minnesota, 17? U.S. 134.
4; 323 U.S. 335 (1911)
.
5] 311 U.S. 489.
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Kidd, Dater & Price Company v. Musselman, 1 in which similar
acts of Connecticut^ and Michigan were upheld. These illus-
trations might be added to, but these cases point toward the
main fact observable , that in cases where the Illinois court
has declared classification invalid, decisions upon similar
matters may be found in other jurisdiction taking the opposite
view, though with regard to most of these subjects the courts
of other 8tates are divided as to the validity of the classi-
fication passed upon.
The examination of the classification rulings of the
Illinois Supreme Court show that a change has been made from
the early cases in which hostility to classification was evident
but the nature of the change is not so apparent. Conflicting
views of classification are found within the same year as in the
Ruhstrat and Booth cases and the Tarantina and Schenck cases.
A liberal attitude toward classification such as is found in
the second Ritchie case is following- in the next year by a very
strict view of classification as in the Josma case. A classi-
fication suggested as proper in Mas3ie v. Cessna is ignored later
in the Josma case. Conflicting decisions appear upon classifi-
cation on the basis of population, on the basis of situation,
conditions in life or legal status. Nowhere is it possible
to trace a clearly developed line of classification decisions
which will make certain to legislators which classification
they may hope to make with a reasonable expectation that such
classification will be sustained. To add to the difficulty,
classifications held void by_ the Illinois court
i; 217 U.S. «61.
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have been "both upheld and declared void in other jurisdictions,
so that the decisions of other courts cannot be relied upon to
create rules of classification. Does the record of the classi-
fication doctrines of the Illinois court show any settled rule
of classification? Clearly not, and the absence of such
settled rules makes possible an even greater extension of judi-
cial control over legislation through the due process of law
clause than has taken place as yet. With no rules for guidance,
the decision of the court in each particular case is a determina-
tion of a question of fact, and as the increasing needs of
industry will demand more specialized classification in legis-
lation, the difficulty of finding a valid classification will be
even more perplexing in the future. The court has thus far
been neither consistent with itself nor with any logical view
in matters of classification in due process of law cases. It
has as yet afforded no guidance upon which the general assembly
may rely with any degree of assurance. No degree of care upon
the part of the general assembly, even when accompanied by a
knowledge of the previous decisions of the court, is sufficient
to determine in advance whether legislative action will be
upheld or annul ed. For the present it is a mere matter of
guesswork as to what position the court may take upon questions
of classification under the due process of law limitation. The
uncertainty of the meaning of due process of law as applied by
the oourt is even more harmful than the strictness of judicial
view manifested in some cases.



